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ABSTRACT

Cyber-physical systems link cyber infrastructure with physical processes through
an integrated network of physical components, sensors, actuators, and computers that are
interconnected by communication links. Modern critical infrastructures such as smart
grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems are
prominent examples of cyber-physical systems. Developed countries are entirely reliant on
these critical infrastructures, hence the need for rigorous assessment of the trustworthiness
of these systems. The objective of this research is quantitative modeling of dependability
attributes - including reliability and survivability - of cyber-physical systems, with domainspecific case studies on smart grids and intelligent water distribution networks. To this end,
we make the following research contributions: i) quantifying, in terms of loss of reliability
and survivability, the effect of introducing computing and communication technologies; and
ii) identifying and quantifying interdependencies in cyber-physical systems and investigating
their effect on fault propagation paths and degradation of dependability attributes.
Our proposed approach relies on observation of system behavior in response to
disruptive events. We utilize a Markovian technique to formalize a unified reliability
model. For survivability evaluation, we capture temporal changes to a service index chosen
to represent the extent of functionality retained. In modeling of interdependency, we apply
correlation and causation analyses to identify links and use graph-theoretical metrics for
quantifying them. The metrics and models we propose can be instrumental in guiding
investments in fortification of and failure mitigation for critical infrastructures.To verify the
success of our proposed approach in meeting these goals, we introduce a failure prediction
tool capable of identifying system components that are prone to failure as a result of a
specific disruptive event. Our prediction tool can enable timely preventative actions and
mitigate the consequences of accidental failures and malicious attacks.
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Vector of predicted failure probabilities

Ci

Set of states for component i

xiii
Ni

Cardinality of Ci

Φ(t)

System state at time t

S

System state space

N

Cardinality of S

U

Binary vector identifying each system state as failed or operational

Π(t)

State distribution vector at time t

Λ

State transition probability matrix

Λi

State transition probability matrix, based on operation of component i

pi

Reliability of component i

qi

Unreliability of component i

R

System reliability

Mk (t) Record of FoM for failure case k
δk

Full extent of degradation in failure case k

∆

Maximum δ over all failure cases

ρk

The most rapid rate of degradation in failure case k

Gk

Set of all components failed in failure case k

Qi

Set of failure cases in which component i has failed

ti(k)

Time at which component i fails during failure case k

αi

Criticality of component i

βi

Fragility of component i

1. INTRODUCTION

Modern critical infrastructures are large complex systems that are expected to be
highly dependable and continuously provide essential services. Examples of such complex
networks are smart grids, intelligent water distribution networks, and intelligent transportation systems. These systems utilize cyber infrastructure, which provides computing-based
decision support and failure monitoring, among other benefits. Collectively, the physical
infrastructure and this network of cyber devices comprise a cyber-physical system (CPS).
A fundamental motivation for supplementing the existing physical systems with computing
and communication is to improve dependability. The research presented in this dissertation
is devoted to determining whether CPSs succeed in providing a higher level of dependability
than their conventional counterparts.
Dependability analysis of CPSs has become increasingly urgent, given the ubiquity
of such systems, extensive use of computing in critical applications, and disruptions that
inevitably occur in critical infrastructures. Past incidents have proven that incapacity of
critical infrastructures can have a catastrophic impact on our health, safety, economics, and
social welfare [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
In the energy sector for example, there has been instances where unexpected failures
in the electric delivery systems has resulted in large-scale power outages with profound
consequences on several sectors of the critical infrastructure. Figure 1.1 depicts three largescale catastrophic power outages since 2000 and highlights the main recommendations
made by task forces that analyzed respective events.
In 2003 Northeastern Blackout, the outage of transmission lines, combined with
a failure in the alarm system, caused an instability and resulted in a series of cascading
failures. These incidents eventually led to a large-scale blackout that affected more than
55 million people [2]. The 2003 Italy Blackout was a cascading power failure that left
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Recommendations [2]
Before

After

Aug. 14, 2003 - Northeastern Blackout
Affected 55 million people

• Strengthen institutional framework for reliability management.
• Expand research on reliabilityrelated tools and technologies.
• Improve cyber and physical
security of the network.
• ...

Dependability Analysis of Critical Infrastructures
Techniques:
•
•
•
•
•

Truth table
Reliability block diagram
Petri-net analysis
Markovian analysis
Fault tree analysis

Recommendations [3]
• Updating reliability standards.
• Ensure redundancy and reliability of control and communication infrastructure.
• Enhancement of special protection systems can be effective.
• ...
Sep. 28, 2003 - Italy Blackout
Affected 56 million people

Outcomes
• Identification of susceptible
parts
• Determining failure propagation
paths
• Prediction of cascading failures
• Elimination/alleviation of the
risk and automating the recovery
and failure mitigation process

Recommendations [4]
• Improve electric grid policies
and standards.
• Develop a resilient power strategy for communications infrastructure.
• ...
Oct. 2012 - Hurricane Sandy
Left 8 million people without power

Figure 1.1. Catastrophic events that motivate this research.

half of the country without power for multiple days [3]. This failure was exacerbated by
the loss of Internet communication nodes due to the power outage, which in turn caused
further breakdown of communication and control at multiple power stations. Hurricane
Sandy is an example where several critical infrastructures were affected due to a natural
disaster [4]. The need for more dependable critical infrastructures and better preparation
has been emphasized in the task force reports of these and several other catastrophic events,
specifically by tightening dependability requirements and incorporating cyber and sociotechnical aspects in investigations.
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In order to improve the dependability of CPSs, accurate models are needed. In a
disruption cycle of a system, dependability models can substantially help at three stages:
1. Before disruption: Models help to raise awareness and understanding of the potential
risks and their consequences, compare alternative recovery strategies, and prepare for
contingency planning.
2. During disruption: Availability of knowledge and resources enable use of appropriate
decisions to mitigate consequences and support rapid recovery.
3. After disruption: Models can help in determining high-priority actions required for
restoration of essential services and resources needed for supporting recovery. Models
should be continually refined based on what learned from the event.
Model-based analysis is a common and effective method for investigating failure
scenarios of a system and evaluating its dependability attributes. Models can facilitate the
comparison of alternative designs and expedite the design process; however, developing
unified models of CPSs is a challenging task, as the model has to reflect hardware and
software operation, as well as the continuous dynamics of physical systems [7]. Despite
increasing activity in research related to CPSs, such models are still scarce, and to a large
extent qualitative.
The overarching objective of this research is analytical modeling of dependability
attributes of CPSs with domain-specific case studies on smart grids and intelligent water
distribution networks. While both qualitative and quantitative models are important and
useful for analysis of CPSs, this work focuses on quantitative modeling, as it has not been
properly addressed in the literature. We evaluate the potential vulnerabilities and quantify
the loss of dependability as a result of introducing computational and communication
technologies . Furthermore, in order to compose a unified dependability model from the
quantified dependability attributes, we study interdependence among the components of
CPSs and investigate its effect on fault propagation paths.
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Dependability is an integrative concept with multiple attributes, from which we seek
to address reliability and survivability, as they have higher priority and are more appropriate
in analysis of power and water critical infrastructures. Interdependency is the concept that
attaches the disparate parts of dependability and provides integrity in model composition.
Our contribution to the area of CPS dependability analysis is shown in Figure 1.2 and further
explained in the following list. Respective publications are mentioned under each item.

Dependability Modeling

Reliability

Survivability

Maintainability

Interdependency

Availability

Integrity

Safety

Figure 1.2. Our contribution to the area of CPS dependability modeling. Attributes that are
covered in this research are shown in hexagons with thick borders.

1. Development of a quantitative reliability model using a Markovian technique that is
applicable to CPSs with interdependent components
• K. Marashi and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Towards comprehensive modeling of
reliability for smart grids: Requirements and challenges,” in Proceedings of
the 15th IEEE International High Assurance Systems Engineering Symposium
(HASE), (Miami, FL), pp. 105–112, January 2014
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• K. Marashi, M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Quantitative
reliability analysis for intelligent water distribution networks,” in Proceedings
of the Embedded Topical Meeting on Risk Management for Complex SocioTechnical Systems (RM4CSS), Annual Meeting of the American Nuclear Society,
(Washington, D.C.), November 2013
• K. Marashi, M. Woodard, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Quantitative reliability analysis for intelligent water distribution networks,” in Risk
Management for Complex Socio-Technical Systems, American Nuclear Society,
to appear
• K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Consideration of cyberphysical interdependencies in reliability modeling of smart grids,” IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Computing – Special Issue on Sustainable Cyber-Physical
Systems, to appear
2. Evaluating quantitative survivability attributes from service indices of CPSs
• M. Woodard, K. Marashi, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Survivability evaluation
and importance analysis for complex networked systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Network Science and Engineering, under review
3. Proposing two methods using correlation metrics and causation analysis for identification of interdependency among components of a CPS
• K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Identification of interdependencies and prediction of fault propagation for cyber-physical systems,”
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, to be submitted
4. Introducing interdependency metrics for quantifying the extent to which components
and subsystems of a CPS are interdependent
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• K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Quantification and analysis of interdependency in cyber-physical systems,” in Proceedings of of the
3rd International Workshop on Reliability and Security Aspects for Critical Infrastructure (ReSA4CI 2016), in conjunction with the 46th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN 2016), (Toulouse,
France), pp. 149–154, June 2016
5. Proposing a method using machine learning tools for prediction of failure sequences
in interdependent CPSs
• K. Marashi, S. Sedigh Sarvestani, and A. R. Hurson, “Identification of interdependencies and prediction of fault propagation for cyber-physical systems,”
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, to be submitted
As well as the listed publications, we compiled a survey article on the recent research
on modeling of CPSs as shown below.
• N. Jarus, M. Woodard, K. Marashi, A. Faza, J. Lin, P. Maheshwari, and S. Sedigh Sarvestani, “Survey on modeling and design of cyber-physical systems,” ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems, under review
Overall, as a result of this research three peer-reviewed conference papers [9, 8, 14],
one book chapter [10], and four journal papers [11, 12, 15, 13] were published.
As mentioned, for demonstration of our proposed modeling approaches we will
perform case studies on smart grid and intelligent water distribution networks. The term
smart grid describes a modernized electrical grid that uses information and communications
technologies and computer-based remote control to improve the efficiency, reliability, and
sustainability of the production and distribution of electricity [16, 1]. Smart grids present
an emerging solution to problems caused by increasing electric power demand from aging
traditional power grids. Water distribution networks are constituents of another critical
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infrastructure that is considered an essential requirement of a modern city and a measure of
the standard of living of the community. The primary goal of the water distribution networks
is to provide a dependable source of potable water to the public. An intelligent water
distribution network is the modern counterpart of the traditional water networks that collects
and utilizes information on demand patterns, water quantity, and water quality in order to
improve dependability, guide maintenance efforts, and identify vulnerable areas requiring
fortification and/or monitoring. Despite difference in the physical commodities, smart
grids and intelligent water distribution networks are common in structural and topological
features, which enables the use of the same modeling approaches for both of these critical
infrastructure CPSs.
The basis for our proposed methods is observation of system’s behavior in a set of
specified states. Given the high dependability expected of critical infrastructures and their
large scale, fault injection studies on actual systems are infeasible, and organic failures are
few and far between. As such, we use simulation platforms for determining the behavior of
water and power systems in the presence of disruptions. Typical domain-specific simulation
environments for power and water systems are incapable of capturing the behavior of the
cyber infrastructure with the resolution required for analysis of CPSs. Therefore, we
integrated MATLAB with these domain-specific simulators, namely, EPANET [17] for
water distribution networks, and PSAT [18] for power grid systems, to enable holistic
cyber-physical simulation.
Simulation environments enable us to inject hardware and software faults and study
the behavior of the system in response to those disruptions. For each dependability attribute,
associated behaviors are captured and populated into a model. Figure 1.3 shows the scope
of our research and outlines our approach for modeling dependability aspects of CPSs.
In our reliability modeling [9, 10, 11], the set of plausible states are investigated
and it is determined through simulation whether each state leads to an operational or failed
system-level state. The results are then populated into a quantitative reliability model
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Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructures
...

Smart Grid

Intelligent Water
Distribution
Network

Intelligent
Transportation
System

Nuclear Power
Plant

Model Abstraction from
System Descriptions
Simulation Environment

Cyber Infrastructure
Software Fault Injection

Hardware Fault Injection
Physical Infrastructure

Observation of System Indices
and Component States

Quantitative Models
Reliability - Markov Chain Imbeddable Structure
Survivability - Survivable Behavior
Interdependency - Correlation and Causation

Figure 1.3. Our approach for dependability modeling of cyber-physical critical infrastructures.

using Markov chain imbeddable structure technique [19]. Unlike reliability modeling, our
survivability evaluation technique tends to capture temporal behavior of the system and
its capabilities in degraded states [12]. We quantify survivable behavior in terms of the
extent and rate of degradation of a measure showing the level to which essential services are
provided. Subsequently, components whose failure is the most detrimental to survivability
are identified and fortified.
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Similarly in our interdependency modeling [13], we observe sequence of events that
occur after injecting software and hardware faults and find fault propagation patterns using
correlation and causation analyses. We then quantify the interdependency using graphtheoretical metrics [14]. With the interdependencies revealed, we are able to take advantage
of our dependability models in i) identifying weaknesses ii) determining how they can lead
to vulnerabilities and propagate to other sections, iii) being prepared for potential risks, iv)
making timely actions to mitigate the consequences of accidental failures and malicious
attacks, and v) devising effective recovery strategies. We investigate the use of machine
learning techniques in building a failure prediction tool, which can help system operators
to better understand the risks and perform timely preventive actions [13]. Our approach is
based on an artificial neural network trained with data collected from observed sequences
of failure and is able to predict imminent failures given the current state of the system.
To illustrate the application of our proposed approaches, we have performed case
studies on power and water systems. For the power domain, we chose well-studied IEEE
14-bus and 57-bus systems and supplied them with overlaid cyber infrastructure. Similarly
for the water domain, we selected a test system studied in the literature and supplied it with
intelligent control. Resulting CPSs do not include all of the existing cyber technologies
used in respective areas, but are representative of real-world systems and are adequate for
demonstration purposes.
What makes this research original and different from existing studies is consideration
of cyber infrastructure as an error-prone entity with complex functionality, instead of
reducing its role to a simple protective device. The quantitative nature of our models and
the use of simulator-generated data, which alleviates the burden of procuring field data, are
other distinctive features of this work.
The intellectual merit of this research is advancing knowledge of the potential loss
of dependability due to the impairments originating in cyber and physical components,
propagated through unprotected channels, and escalated into catastrophes in interdependent
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critical infrastructures. The broader impact of this research is a reduction in service interruptions and increased tolerance against disruptions for critical infrastructure CPSs. This is
attained by providing models that enable engineers to better understand the consequences
of their design decisions.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses dependability attributes, summarizes related literature on modeling of CPS interdependency,
reliability, and survivability, and articulates the uniqueness of our research in the context
of the existing studies. Section 3 presents the methodology used in developing our models
and Section 4 presents the results obtained from application of the proposed approaches to
power and water systems. Section 5 outlines future research directions and concludes this
dissertation.

11
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

Dependability is a non-functional attribute that captures the behavior of a system
during its life cycle. In the literature, dependability is defined as “the ability of a system to
avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is acceptable” [20]. It is
an integrative concept that encompasses reliability, availability, safety, integrity, and maintainability. Each of these constituent attributes has a different definition and is meaningful
for specific applications. For example, availability is an appropriate metric where a short
outage of the service is negligible, but the system should be functional most of the time,
e.g., web services. On the other hand, reliability is a meaningful metric where intermittent
operation is not acceptable and the system should be continually functional, e.g., a power
delivery system.
As indicated in [21, 20], survivability and dependability are concepts that are essentially equivalent in their goals and address similar threats with minor differences, thus
survivability is considered as a dependability-related attribute.
Reliability and availability, two important aspects of dependability, consider the
system state to be binary – operational or failed. This view is sometimes inadequate for
large-scale CPSs such as critical infrastructures, which are expected to deliver uninterrupted
service despite continual disturbances. It is expected that a large-scale system will spend
time in functionally degraded states, without interruption of essential services. Consequently, additional non-functional attributes are required to characterize these degraded, yet
operational states.
Performability, introduced by Meyer [22], combines performance and availability to
evaluate system effectiveness, taking into account behavior due to failures. In other words,
a system can be in a fully functional state, a partially operational state with degraded performance, or a failed state. Performability evaluates the expected performance over a duration
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composed of alternating operational/degraded/failed periods. Introducing performability as
a metric that combines availability (pessimistic, binary view of operation) and performance
(optimistic, neglects periods of inoperability) is an effort to attain a realistic view of the
system. Survivability is another non-functional attribute that was introduced with a similar
objective, and is used to characterize degraded operation. Survivability can be used to
describe degraded operation at any point after a disturbance occurs, regardless of whether
the disturbance is a fault tolerated by the system, or a failure that actually causes degradation. Another attribute closely related to survivability is Resilience, which is defined as the
ability of a system to bounce back from failure [23, 24], but its application is limited to the
recovery phase that follows a failure, not any period beforehand.
Among the dependability attributes, our focus is on reliability and survivability. We
have analyzed reliability as it is a meaningful and commonly used measure for evaluation of
the domains of our interest, i.e., the electric power delivery and water distribution networks.
Besides the features captured by reliability, critical infrastructure CPSs are expected to
autonomously defend against attacks, remediate the consequences of failure, and recover
in a timely manner. Classical dependability attributes such as reliability provide coarsegrained characterization of these qualities, unlike survivability, whose very purpose is
to precisely characterize transient behavior after a disturbance. For this exact reason, it
has been used in several different domains including weapons systems engineering [25],
telecommunication services [26], information systems [21], and software engineering [27].
Reliability has a formal definition from which a quantitative definition was derived.
Reliability is a measure of the continuous delivery of correct service, and is formally
defined as “the ability of a system or component to perform its required functions under
stated conditions for a specified period of time” [28]. On the other hand, no standard
definition of survivability was identified at the time of writing this dissertation; perspectives
on the topic are diverse [29]. A concise qualitative definition presented by Heegaard and
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Trivedi [30] states that “Survivability is the system’s ability to continuously deliver services
in compliance with the given requirements in the presence of failures and other undesired
events.”
Survivability has been quantitatively defined for networked systems by the ANSI
T1A1.2 working group [31], using a domain-specific figure-of-merit (FoM), as shown in
Figure 2.1:
“Suppose a measure of interest M has the value m0 just before a failure occurs.
The survivability behavior can be depicted by the following attributes: ma is the
value of M just after the failure occurs; mu is the maximum difference between
the value of M and ma after the failure; mr is the restored value of M after some
time tr ; and t R is the time for the system to restore the value of m0 .”
To better illustrate the differences between the aforementioned dependability-related
attributes, one operation and recovery cycle of a repairable system is shown in Figure 2.1.
Note that M(t) denotes an FoM chosen to represent the behavior or performance of the
system over time. According to the definitions provided, the scopes of reliability and
survivability, as well as other discussed attributes are indicated on Figure 2.1.

Original
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M (t)
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Recovery
Event
Triggered

Failure
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State

mr
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Reliability
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Survivability/
Performability

ts

tf

time

Resilience

Availability

Figure 2.1. Durations of applicability for dependability-related metrics.
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In the remainder of this section, the studies closest to the scope of our research are
reviewed. Among the large amount of publications in the areas of our interest, we mostly
focused on those that have been applied or are applicable to critical infrastructure CPSs,
specifically the smart power grid. The related literature is organized as shown in Figure 2.2.

Identification
[48, 55, 56]
Modeling/Analysis
[49, 54]
Interdependencies

Quantification
[49, 50, 51, 52, 53]
Fault Propagation
[48]
Failure Prediction
[46, 47]
Cyber-Physical

Dependability Analysis

Quantitative
[40, 41, 42, 43]

Reliability

Purely Physical

Survivability

Qualitative
[44, 45]

Qualitative
[30, 36]

Qualitative
[39]
Quantitative
[37, 38]

Quantitative
[30, 32, 33, 34, 35]

Figure 2.2. Organization of the related literature along with examples of each category.

2.1. RELATED WORK ON CPS INTERDEPENDENCY
There is an extensive literature devoted to the analysis of interdependency and its
effects. The interdependence can be viewed as the relationships among the components
of a single system [57], or among services provided by different systems [48, 58]. In the

15
area of critical infrastructure, Rinaldi et al. have provided an ontology for understanding
interdependence and classified its types into physical, cyber, geographic, and logical [59].
Similar classifications are presented in other studies, as enumerated in [60].
Researchers have used different approaches to identify interdependence among components, systems, or operations. In [48], the interdependencies between electrical infrastructure and the associated information infrastructure are qualitatively investigated and the
pattern of fault propagation is explored. There are also examples of using correlation metrics
for studying the interdependence. In [55], Pearson’s correlation metric is used to investigate
dependence among critical infrastructures after the World Trade Center attack. In another
study [56], the time-series analysis is utilized to reveal interdependencies across critical
infrastructures from post-event restoration curves of February 2010 Chile earthquake.
Models of interdependency are presented using a variety of techniques such as
topology-based and flow-based methods, Bayesian networks, and Petri nets. In [49], Beccuti
et al. proposed an approach using stochastic Petri nets for modeling the operation of
the physical and cyber networks in electric power delivery systems. They subsequently
measured the effect of disruptions of one network on the other (e.g., as a result of a
cyber attack) in terms of a number of domain-specific performance indices. The study
presented in [54] is an example of the application of dynamic Bayesian networks to analyzing
interdependencies of critical infrastructures.
Another group of studies are devoted to quantification of interdependencies. Casalicchio and Galli have presented a number of quantitative metrics for interdependencies
in critical infrastructures [50]. Studies presented in [51, 52, 53] use topological metrics
(e.g., connectivity and size of giant component) to quantify interdependency in a network;
however, for the case of power grids, Verma et al. argue that topological measures that are
not context-aware may underestimate vulnerability of the system [61]. Additionally in [62],
a comparison between blackout size and topological measures was performed for several
power grid cases and only a mild correlation was observed.
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As mentioned earlier, an important result of interdependency analysis is to predict
the risk of failures for components and systems, prioritize preventive maintenance, and
perform timely actions to mitigate effects of disruptions. In [46], statistical machine
learning techniques were used to predict failure of feeder lines in boroughs of New York
City over a three-month period and showed an acceptable accuracy of 75%. Additional
results on application of the proposed methods are presented in [47].

2.2. RELATED WORK ON CPS RELIABILITY
Many researchers have studied the reliability of purely physical systems. It is
important to clarify that there are abundant studies on analysis of critical infrastructures
providing measures of reliability, however, they do not present quantitative models based on
the formal definitions. Focus of this section is on reviewing the studies that present models
only.
One classical analysis approach is the employment of Monte Carlo simulations. An
example is [63], where an analytical model populated using a Monte Carlo simulation is
presented for evaluating the reliability indices of power distribution systems. Fault tree
analysis, another popular tool, is used in [37] for reliability evaluation of power systems.
Bayesian networks approach is also a useful probabilistic tool for system reliability assessment that offers a transparent modeling scheme. It is used in [64], where a framework for
system reliability assessment is presented and an algorithm is introduced in order to address
the issue of exponential growth of the system states.
Graph-theoretical approaches have also been of interest to researchers for many
modeling problems, as in [38], where authors have modeled the reliability of power grids.
Their work aims at finding the most vulnerable nodes and edges with respect to attacks and
accidental failures. They have formulated the reliability model considering both electrical
indices (impedance of transmission lines) and reliability indices (probability of failure in
network components).
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The aforementioned studies do not examine the role of the cyber network. The
reliability analysis techniques utilized in these studies are only applicable to purely physical
system and may not be directly used for CPSs, which have heterogeneity and cyber-physical
interdependencies [65].
In the last decade, extensive studies have been performed to determine the impacts
of communication, information network, and computers on critical infrastructure CPSs.
In [45], the author outlines at a very high-level, a mathematical framework for quantitative
reliability analysis of cyber-physical power grids and compares potential approaches for
accurate reliability modeling. The study presented in [66] discusses some of the complications due to the addition of the cyber layer to the power systems and investigates possibilities
for transferring and utilizing the high volume of data gathered from numerous measurement devices effectively. Another study presented in [40] uses a pseudo-sequential Monte
Carlo simulation and provides a tool for reliability assessment of smart power distribution
systems considering failure of the communication infrastructure and short-term variations
in distributed generation sites. An example of applying graph-theoretical methods to cyberphysical environments is [67], where the best topological configuration in terms of system
reliability is investigated.
Generally, due to the diversity of the technologies that are nowadays being incorporated in a CPS, many of the recent reliability analyses focus on specific subsystems, e.g.,
the measurement subsystem [68] and communications [69].
In contrast, a number of studies have taken a holistic view of reliability for CPSs,
taking consequences of disruptions in the cyber network into account to varying extents. For
instance, [41] combines fault tree analysis, partial state space evaluation, and simulations
to propose a quantitative reliability model for smart grids. The study focuses on reducing
computational intensity and complexity of mathematical calculations by state merging
and eliminating the states representing rare contingencies. This work however, is in an
embryonic state and no tangible quantitative result is presented on a specific example.
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Two other closely related studies are [42] and [43] that quantitatively evaluate the
reliability of smart grids considering respectively direct and indirect interdependencies
between power elements and cyber control devices. Shortcomings of [42, 43] are the
consideration of limited and simplistic functions for the cyber network and overlooking
interdependencies with intermediary events.

2.3. RELATED WORK ON CPS SURVIVABILITY
Comparison of survivability evaluation techniques is complicated by the lack of
a common definition for this attribute. Knight et al. [36] has presented a survivability
definition and model based on a service state-transition graph constructed from a sixtuple of service specification levels, service value factors, reachable environmental states,
relative service values, set of valid transitions, and service probabilities. Ma [32] similarly
quantifies survivability as a four-tuple of resistance, resilience, persistence, and failure
count. In [32], resistance refers to the ability to withstand an attack, resilience refers to
the mean recovery time from a catastrophic failure, persistence is the ability to maintain
or exceed the minimal threshold of required functionality, and failure count describes the
number of failures encountered over the duration of observation. In both of these studies
the individual attributes are well-defined, but disjoint, and as such, none of them lead to a
practical approach for quantitative evaluation of survivability.
Menasché et al. [33] have proposed an enhancement to the well-known SAIDI1 metric. Their measure is denoted as ESAIDI and applied to evaluation of survivability aspects
of a smart grid. ESAIDI is intended to facilitate analysis of the consequences of failures in
distribution automation in the power grid. Avritzer et al. [70] utilize the same approach and
further extend the model to account for disruptions in the communication infrastructure.
This work was later combined with power flow analysis to create a survivability model that
facilitates optimal design for the automation system of a smart grid [71]. A subsequent
1System average interruption duration index
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extension of the work [72] allowed for concurrent failures in the power system. All of these
approaches [33, 70, 71, 72] use time-to-recovery as a measure of survivability; however,
time-to-recovery spans both the failure and recovery processes, and as such, cannot be used
to separately evaluate system during each of these two phases.
Alobaidi et al. [35] evaluate the survivability of smart grids by studying the relationship between system condition (in terms of the number of functional components) and
system capacity (ability to provide power to customers). The authors also propose and
demonstrate recovery strategies intended to maximize survivability. The limitation of the
proposed approach is that it is applicable only to power systems. In contrast, the work we
present can be applied to any networked system with a known topology.
Chopade and Bikdash [34] present a model for survivability of a smart grid, based on
graph-theoretic measures such as degree distribution and clustering coefficient. All buses
(vertices) and lines (edges) are assumed to be identical. This is an unrealistic assumption
given that reliability and other attributes of buses and lines can vary significantly in a power
grid. In a similar vein, [73] evaluates the survivability of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
as the probability that all active nodes are k-connected to the network. This probability is
determined using a semi-Markov model that captures state transitions due to node failures
and malicious attacks. The connectedness of MANETs is a representative measure of their
functionality; thus, the probability of being k-connected can reflect survivability. The
proposed method is ill-suited to evaluation of any system expected to provide services
beyond connectivity.
Avritzer et al. [29] survey recent approaches to survivability evaluation of water, gas,
and electricity infrastructures. Stochastic hybrid models such as fluid stochastic Petri nets,
hybrid Petri nets, and piece-wise deterministic Markov processes, as well as graph-theoretic
approaches, are among the methods described.
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2.4. THE DISTINCTION OF THIS RESEARCH
In spite of existing literature on dependability modeling of critical infrastructure
CPSs, there are critical gaps that we seek to fill in this research. The missing parts of
the literature, which are addressed in this dissertation are (i) quantitative dependability
modeling, and (ii) consideration of cyber-physical interdependencies and analyzing the
potential risk of increasing the failure propagation channels by deploying computational
and communication technologies. An important feature of this work is consideration of
the role of cyber infrastructure as a decision-making entity and not simply tasked with
monitoring and protection. Another distinction is generality of the proposed approaches,
which makes them applicable to multiple critical infrastructure domains.
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3. METHODOLOGY

The focus of this research is on developing quantitative system-level reliability and
survivability models for CPSs that accurately reflect the operation (and failure) of intelligent
decision support and control, the physical operation, and the interdependency between the
two. This work presents integrated quantitative models that capture impairments in both
physical and cyber infrastructures. We also present a scheme of fault propagation in CPSs to
identify the components that need to be reinforced in order to impede a cascade of failures.
In the remainder of this section, our approaches for identification and quantification
of interdependencies, as well as analyses on reliability and survivability are described. It
is worth mentioning that in the following discussions, we make assumptions specific to the
smart grid domain (e.g., regarding the components and their roles); however, the approach
is applicable to other domains.

3.1. ANALYSIS OF INTERDEPENDENCIES
Dependency is a linkage between two components, through which the state of one
component influences or is correlated to the state of the other. In this case, the relationship
is usually unidirectional, i.e., component i depends on j, but j does not depend on i. As an
example, correct operation of a software that determines control commands for actuators
in a robotic system is contingent on correct data from a sensor that detects surrounding
objects. In this example, the software depends on the sensor, but the sensor does not depend
on the software, as it can continue its operation regardless of the state of the software.
CPSs typically have an interconnected topology in which a bidirectional relationship
may exist between the states of any given pair of components. Interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two components through which the state of each component
influences or is correlated to the state of the other. In other words, component i depends
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on j through a number of links, and j likewise depends on i through other links. More
generally, two components are known to be interdependent when each is dependent on the
other.
3.1.1. Representation of Interdependencies. For representation of interdependencies in a CPS, we use dependency graph that is a two-level weighted directed graph in
which an edge exists from node i to node j if and only if the state of component i impacts,
in one time step, the state of component j. We select time step small enough that we can
assume impairment of a component propagates to the others through direct links only, not
through multiple intermediate links.
Depending on the source and destination of an edge, it can represent one of four types
of dependency, namely, physical-physical, physical-cyber, cyber-physical, and cyber-cyber.
Note that in this notation, s1 − s2 dependence represents a relation in which components
of subsystem 1 (s1 ) influence components of subsystem 2 (s2 ). As an example, Figure 3.1
illustrates the dependency graph for a hypothetical CPS.
In Figure 3.1, the bottom plane encompasses components of the physical system
and the top plane is representative of the cyber infrastructure that monitors and controls
the underlying physical processes. The weights shown on the edges represent the extent
of dependency, denoted as the degree of influence and are in the range of [0, 1], where a
0 means that there is no functional influence from a component on another, and a 1 is the
case where the state of a component causes maximal degradation to the state of another,
i.e., makes it unable to operate.
For mathematical representation, we introduce direct influence matrix, denoted as

D = di j ∈ [0, 1]n×n , which is in fact the adjacency matrix of the dependency graph. di j


represents the degree of influence that component i exerts on component j and n is the total
number of components in the system. Note that the entries on the diagonal of D should
always equal zero, as a faulty state of a component “propagates” to itself immediately, not
after one time step.
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Figure 3.1. Dependency graph of a hypothetical CPS.

3.1.2. Identification of Interdependencies. Interdependency between components
can be due to causality or simply a correlation. In a causation relationship, state of a component is responsible for that of another. On the other hand, state of two components are
correlated when they have a statistical relationship, whether causal or not. Depending on
the purpose of interdependency analysis, correlation or causation relationships may be of
interest. In this section, we present two approaches for capturing correlation and causality,
respectively, from observations of failure sequences corresponding to a set of failure cases.
A failure case is composed of a set of distinct components whose failure leads to
disturbance to the system. These initial disruptions, exerted to the system at time te , may
propagate to other components through dependency links, resulting in a failure sequence.
Let Fk (t) represent the set of components that experience degradation during failure case k
at time t.
In our approach, a set of failure cases are selected, and subsequent failures are
observed. Dependency links are then extracted by analyzing these sequences. Note that a
larger set of failure cases, and consequently, more observations will improve the accuracy
of the interdependency model.
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3.1.2.1. Correlation analysis. Statistical dependence between random variables
that represent state of components is a potential tool for measuring interdependence. Conventional measures of dependence, such as Pearson’s correlation coefficient, consider only
a limited class of association patterns. More complicated correlation measures are able to
detect non-linear relationships as well.
For each component we define a state variable, which is a random variable that
characterizes the state of the component and subsequently, determine correlation between
these random variables. Let Xi (t) denote the state variable of component i at time t. For
analysis of dependency of component j on component i, Pearson’s correlation coefficient
(PCC) between Xi (t) and X j (t) is calculated, as shown in Equation (3.1).
r Xi X j =

cov(Xi, X j )
σXi σX j

(3.1)

Where cov(.) is the covariance and σ is the standard deviation of a state variable. As explained in Section 3.1.1, we are interested in finding di j values, which represent dependence
in one time step. Furthermore, direction of relationship (increasing or decreasing) is not of
our interest. Therefore, we use PCCXi X j = |r Xi (t)X j (t+1) | to capture the direct dependency.
Shortcoming of PCC is that it only detects linear relationships, while an impaired
component may result in disturbances, not necessarily linear, in another component. Among
correlation coefficients introduced for detecting nonlinear relationships, we selected randomized dependence coefficient (RDC) [74], which has a low computational complexity
and shows a good performance in comparison with similar methods. Readers are referred
to [74] for more information on RDC. In this document, we use RDCXi X j notation to represent RDC correlation between state variables Xi and X j . Note that RDC has two parameters
associated with it, namely, sample size and number of random features, which can be set
using guidelines provided in [74].
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For identification of interdependencies we can compute mean value of correlation
coefficients (either PCC or RDC) between Xi and X j over all failure cases and use it as an
estimator for di j .
3.1.2.2. Causation analysis. In general, a causal relationship is harder to establish
than correlation, and hence, fewer interdependency studies have investigated causality. We
use a method inspired by the interaction model introduced in [75], to identify causation
relationships and estimate D. The work presented in [75], determines the interactions
among components of a power grid, finds key dependency links, and provides strategies for
mitigating cascading failures. In this section, we present a similar method that is generalized
to be applicable for cyber-physical systems. Specifically, we have extended the method to
incorporate heterogeneous components, control the sensitivity in detecting causality, and
to account for dependency relationships between degraded states rather than binary states.
Consider a system composed of n components, for which m failure cases are observed. From the set of all failure sequences, i.e., Fk (t), ∀k, we can construct matrix
 
W = wi j ∈ Zn×n , where wi j shows the number of times component j has degraded one
time step after degradation of component i over all failure cases. Components in the set
Fk (t − 1) whose states are known to be the dominant causes for degradation of component
j in Fk (t) are identified using Equation (3.2).
Hk, j (t) = { i | i ∈ Fk (t − 1), wi j ≥ η max wl j }
l∈Fk (t−1)

(3.2)

In Equation (3.2), η controls the sensitivity in detecting the causative relationships, and is set
 
to 0.9 in this work. Matrix E = ei j ∈ Zn×n is constructed as shown in Equation (3.3), where
ei j is the number of times degradation of component i caused degradation of component j.
E =
ei j =




ei j
m Õ
Õ
k=1 t>0

card({ (k, t) | i ∈ Hk, j (t) })

(3.3)
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In Equation (3.3), card(.) denotes the cardinality of a set. Assuming that fi is the total
ei j
number of times component i experiences degradation over all failure cases,
estimates
fi
the likelihood of component i having a causative relationship with component j, i.e., the
degree to which degradation of component i “causes” degradation in component j.
3.1.3. Quantification of Interdependencies. Assuming that the direct influence
matrix D is known, we can explore dependency of components in multiple time steps.
Specifically, we are interested in the k th -level influence matrix, which represents the influence that components have on each other over exactly k time steps – in contrast to D, where
the influence exerted over a single time step is captured. To this end, we first normalize D
 k
n
Í
by dividing it by n to ensure that
di j ≤ 1. Matrix 1n D represents k th -level influence
j=1

matrix. The total influence matrix, T, can be computed as shown in Equation (3.4).
k
∞ 
Õ
 
1
T = ti j = V ◦
D
n
k=1

V = [vi j ]

n+1


,

 n

vi j =

n+1



,
 n−1

i , j;
, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n

(3.4)

i = j.

In Equation (3.4), ◦ represents the entrywise product and ti j shows the degree by which
component j can be influenced by a failure in component i in any number of time steps,
which reveals indirect influences. Note that the matrix V is used to scale ti j to [0, 1] range.
In Equations (3.5) and (3.6), we define τi , and ν j , which are respectively the weighted
out-degree of node i and weighted in-degree of node j, in order to evaluate the extent of
influence components exert on or receive from other components.
n

τi

1Õ
=
ti j
n j=1

νj

1Õ
=
ti j
n i=1

(3.5)

n

(3.6)
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We will also measure the average dependence that components of subsystem s1 have on
components of subsystem s2 . For this purpose, γs1 −s2 is calculated as shown in Equation (3.7).
γs1 −s2 =

1 ÕÕ
ti j
ns1 ns2 i∈s j∈s
1

(3.7)

2

In Equation (3.7), ns1 and ns2 are the number of elements in subsystems s1 and s2 , respectively, and ns1 + ns2 = n. Note that τ, ν, and γs1 −s2 are all normalized to the [0, 1] range so
that systems of different sizes can be easily compared.

3.2. RELIABILITY MODELING
A prerequisite for reliability modeling is to clearly define system-level failure. Assuming that such definition is provided, we can represent the system reliability as the probability of being in one of the system-level operational states. Our approach uses Markov
chain imbeddable structure technique [19], which is an analytical method for reliability
evaluation of systems with components whose reliabilities are known.
3.2.1. System State. Ideally, all components of a system are in a fully functional
state, however, this is not always the case. Each component may make a transition to
another degraded state due to an internal or external disruption. Let Ci denote the set of
states for component i with a cardinality of Ni . For a system composed of n components,
system state can be represented by vector Φ = [φi ], where φi ∈ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The system
În
Ni different states, hence, the system state space is represented
can be in one of N = i=1
by S = { Φ j | 1 ≤ j ≤ N }. Each of these N states can be classified as “operational” or
“failed,” as represented by the vector U = [u j ], where u j is determined as shown in Equation
(3.8).


 1, Φ j is an operational state;

uj =
,

 0, otherwise.


1≤ j≤N

(3.8)
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Assuming that Φ(t) is the system state at time t, the state distribution vector at time t is
Π(t) = [π j (t)], where π j (t) = Pr {Φ(t) = Φ j }, 1 ≤ j ≤ N.
3.2.2. State Transitions. Starting from an initial state at t = 0, captured by Π(0),
the system can make transitions to other states with specific probabilities. These transition probabilities are in fact product terms composed of reliabilities and unreliabilities
of the components. Due to the scope of reliability, state transitions are only considered
until the system falls into a failed state, i.e., transitions in the repair phase are not incorporated. Let Λ = [λ kl ] represent the transition probability matrix of the system, where
λ kl = Pr {transition from state k to state l}, 1 ≤ k, l ≤ N. Similarly let Λi denote the state
transition based on operation of component i. With this notation, there exist n transition probability matrices which collectively determine the ultimate state distribution of the
system.
3.2.3. Markov Chain Imbeddable Structure. Assuming that the matrix U is
known through investigation of all states in S, the overall reliability of the system can
be expressed as shown in Equation (3.9). It can be seen that R will in the form of sum
of products, where each term represents the probability of being in one of the operational
states.
R = Π(0)

n
Ö

!
Λi UT

(3.9)

i=1

Computational complexity for developing a model using Markov chain imbeddable structure
technique is high; however, elimination of implausible states and use of data structures that
fit this application (e.g., sparse matrices for Λ) will drastically mitigate the complexity. In
a previous work [76], state aggregation as a complexity reduction method for reliability
modeling has been investigated and found to be unnecessary for analysis of systems smaller
than a specific size.
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3.3. SURVIVABILITY MODELING
The high availability required in critical infrastructures makes it infeasible to bring
down the system for fault injection studies. Detailed reports of real-world failures are few
and far between, and many of the potential failure scenarios have never actually occurred
in practice, necessitating the use of simulation tools. No simulation environment perfectly
captures the characteristics of real-world entities; however, simulation does provide a good
understanding of system behavior at minimal cost. This section introduces a survivability
evaluation for CPSs, with an approach that can rely upon data from simulation, laboratory
and/or field observation, and historical data about failures. We also present a method for
identifying components whose failure is the most detrimental to survivability.
3.3.1. Survivability Attributes. Our survivability evaluation approach relies upon
identification of a domain-specific FoM that is indicative of the extent to which one or more
essential services are provided. In [31], graceful degradation and failure resistance are
mentioned as two attributes essential to survivability. In defining metrics for survivability,
we describe these attributes (with reference to Figure 2.1) as follows:
dM(t)
, after a
dt
disturbance is considered to be slow, in the context of the time scale of the system

• Graceful degradation is achieved when the rate of degradation,

domain.
• Failure resistance indicates that the extent of degradation, |M(td ) − M(te )|, after a
disturbance, i.e., the loss in FoM value incurred between the start of the disturbance
and initiation of recovery, leaves the system functionality at an acceptable level.
The FoM is domain-specific, as it is intended to capture the extent to which a system
is delivering essential services. In this work, we consider the FoM to represent a single
service. Our survivability evaluation approach can be used to represent more complex
behavior by defining an FoM that is a composite, e.g., a weighted average, of metrics that
reflect different essential services.
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3.3.2. Evaluation of Survivability. Graceful degradation and failure resistance
are two attributes that are pivotal to our proposed approach to survivability evaluation and
component importance analysis. We evaluate survivability through the following actions,
carried out consecutively, seeking to quantify these attributes.
1. A system-specific FoM and a set of representative failure cases are selected to evaluate
the system.
2. Each failure case is observed or simulated, and the value of the FoM is monitored
over an interval that begins with a fully functional system, includes a disruption that
causes degradation to the FoM, and continues through initiation of recovery efforts.
3. The rate and extent, respectively, of degradation of the FoM are calculated from the
log of FoM values.
In each failure case, faults are injected to a set of distinct components at time te (as
in Figure 2.1). Let Fk (t) represent the set of components failed at time t during failure
case k. We consider component-level operation to be binary, i.e., a component is either
fully functional or has failed altogether. This assumption is justified where the system
representation is fine-grained and the contribution of a single component to delivery of an
essential service cannot be further decomposed.
Exhaustive examination of failure cases is infeasible for large complex systems.
On the other hand, omission of failure cases with catastrophic consequences could render
survivability evaluation meaningless. This state space explosion problem is common in
any type of system evaluation and its resolution is not within the scope of this dissertation.
In this work we will assume that we have a predefined set of failure cases as the basis of
survivability evaluation.
Suppose we have a system with n components and m failure cases that have been
designated as the basis of survivability evaluation. Each failure case is observed or simulated for a duration that begins with a fully functional system where all components are
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operational, continues through the disturbance caused by failure of the components in Fk (te ),
and ends when recovery efforts are initiated. In other words, observation or simulation of
the failure case k produces a record of the FoM, Mk (t), for t0 ≤ t ≤ td , where t0 and td are
as defined in Figure 2.1. It is worth noting that the failures of the components initiating
the disturbance at te , Fk (te ), can lead to failures of other components. This larger set of
components, denoted as Gk , includes any component whose failure is observed between te
and td .
Survivability analysis requires that the Mk (t) be examined to determine the extent
and rate of degradation. In terms of Figure 2.1, we seek to determine the full extent of
degradation, denoted as δk , incurred between the instant of disturbance (te ) and initiation
of recovery (td ). Over the same period, the most rapid rate of degradation is denoted as
ρ k . Equations (3.10) and (3.11), respectively, reflect these attributes. The survivability of a
system is determined by aggregating the extent and rate of degradation for all failure cases.
δk = max |Mk (t0 ) − Mk (t)|

(3.10)

dMk (t)
dt

(3.11)

te ≤t≤td

ρ k = max

te ≤t≤td

Visualization of the FoM, as in Figure 3.2, facilitates evaluation of survivability. For each
failure case, a degradation point, (ρ k , δk ), is used to calculate the degradation index, defined
as the distance from the degradation point to the origin. The single degradation point (failure
case) shown in Figure 3.2 has ρ = 0.25, δ = 0.6, and a degradation index of 0.65. The
degradation index facilitates comparison of failure cases and can be averaged across all
failure cases to calculate a single survivability index for the system.
Creating a two-dimensional color intensity histogram of the degradation index, over
all failure cases considered, can facilitate identification of clusters indicative of failure cases
that are similar in consequence. In an ideal system, only one cluster would be evident, near
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Figure 3.2. Rate and extent of FoM degradation, (ρ, δ), for a failure case.

the origin, in the lower left corner of the plot. This cluster is characterized by slow and
minimal degradation of the system. Clusters outside of this area represent failure cases that
merit further investigation, as they reflect non-survivable behavior.
3.3.3. Component Importance Analysis. Evaluation of survivability can illuminate weaknesses in a system. Specifically, our method can facilitate identification of
components most in need of fortification, i.e., importance analysis, where the measure of
importance is the contribution of a component to survivability. We propose two criteria for
ranking components, namely, criticality and fragility.
The criticality of a component is determined by the consequences of its failure on
service degradation, evaluated over all failure cases in which the component experiences
failure. Recall that associated with each failure case k is a set, Gk , that encompasses all
components observed to fail during the failure case. As described in Section 3.3.2, the
highest degradation incurred during a given failure case k is denoted as δk . To determine
the criticality of component i, we need to identify every failure case in which it was observed
to fail, the set of these cases, Qi = { k | i ∈ Gk , 1 ≤ k ≤ m }. Additionally, let ti(k) denote the
time at which component i has failed during failure case k. The criticality of a component
is composed of three terms: The first term normalizes the extent of degradation to rank
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the severity of the failure case. The second term normalizes the rate of degradation at the
instant of component i’s failure during failure case k. The third term normalizes the second
derivative of the FoM at the instant of component i’s failure during failure case k. We
consider this term to be indicative of the immediate impact of this specific component’s
failure during the failure case. The product is calculated and summed across all failure cases
involving component i and divided by m, the total number of failure cases. The criticality
of component i, αi , is determined as shown in Equation (3.12).
second term

third term

}|
{ª
©
z }| { z
 first term
®
2
d Mk (t)
z }| { dMk (t)
®

®
(k)
(k) ®
Õ
2

t=ti
t=ti
dt
dt
1
δ
k

®
αi =
·
 max δ ·
2 M (t) ®
dM
(t)
m
k
d
l
®
k
k∈Qi 
max
max
 1≤l≤m
®
∀t
dt
∀t

dt 2 ®

®
«
¬

(3.12)

A less precise measure of the importance of a component is provided by fragility, which
reflects the fraction of observed or simulated failure cases in which the component has failed.
The fragility of component i, denoted as βi , can be determined as shown in Equation (3.13),
where m is the total number of failure cases.
βi =

|Qi |
m

(3.13)

Either criticality or fragility can be used to determine the priority of a component for hardening efforts. Given that fragility is calculated without consideration of service degradation
(as represented by the FoM), its use is recommended only in cases where failure information
does not involve the exact time when each component failed.
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3.4. PREDICTION OF FAILURE SEQUENCES
Upon availability of sufficient failure data and knowledge on interdependency among
the components of a system, a prediction tool may be used to detect catastrophic failures in
their incipient stage and enable the supervisory control team to perform timely preventive
actions and make appropriate decisions to mitigate the consequences. For this purpose,
powerful and reliable tools are needed that are capable of identifying the components (or
sections of the system) that are prone to failure as a result of a disruptive event. Furthermore,
such tools are expected to respond in real-time and provide a prioritization of the components
that are in risk, based on their failure likelihood and importance of their roles in the system.
3.4.1. Preparation of the Failure Data. Assuming that failure data of a system is
available, we need to convert them into a data set composed of several input/output entries
to be used for training the predictor tool. Figure 3.3 shows an example of a failure sequence
for a hypothetical system with eight components. In this failure case, the system initially
has faults in components 2 and 6. The faulty state is propagated to other components and
affects component 1, then components 4 and 8, and finally component 5. We transform this
failure case into four entries of the data set used for training the predictor tool, as shown
in the right of Figure 3.3. Each entry of the data set has two fields: i) an array of the state
variables at a time instant and ii) a list of components that will degrade at the next time step.
3.4.2. Artificial Neural Networks Approach. The problem of predicting a sequence of events is closely related to classification and sequence labeling in time series
analysis. In this work, we transform the problem of sequence prediction to a multi-class
classification and investigate the use of artificial neural networks (ANN) for tackling this
problem. Reports show that the ANN is a promised tool for classification problems [77].
In a multi-class classification problem, a given instance is to be associated with a number of classes. The classification can also be probabilistic, where the classifier provides
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Figure 3.3. Transformation of a failure sequence into four entries of the data set used for
training the failure prediction algorithm.

probability distribution of a given instance belonging to the existing classes. Some of the
popular classification problems are speech recognition, pattern recognition, and several
other applications in medical imaging.
For a system with n components, let X(t) = (X1 (t), X2 (t), . . . , Xn (t)) denote the input
array to the ANN, where Xi (t) is the state variable of component i at the time instant t.
X(t) is fed to a multi-layer fully connected ANN with the architecture shown in Figure 3.4.
The Output layer provides Y = (Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn ), where Yi represents the probability that
component i fails as a result of disruption specified by the given state variables in the input.

Hidden layer 1
Hidden layer 5
Hidden layer 4 (128 nodes)
(128 nodes) Hidden layer 2
(64 nodes) Hidden layer 3 (64 nodes)
Input layer
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Figure 3.4. Architecture of the multi-layer fully connected ANN used for failure prediction.
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In the nodes of the hidden layers, we have used the softplus activation function [78],
which is a differentiable and smooth version of the well-known rectifier function, to introduce nonlinearity to the ANN. The optimizer used for updating weights of the ANN is
Adam, as introduced in [79] and the loss function is found by calculating the cross entropy
between sigmoid of the failure predictions and that of the actual failures. In order to prevent overfitting during the training process, we utilized L2 regularization method, which
penalizes the network for large weights by increasing the loss.
The choice of ANN architecture is generally based on heuristic rules and is only
for the sake of demonstrating applicability of the method. The architecture described here
has shown an excellent performance on the test cases investigated in Section 4.5; however,
depending on the type and size of the system under test, adjustments may be required.
The ANN is trained using a data set generated by simulating a number of failure
cases or data from historical information of previous disruptions. In either case, each entry
of the data set should include state variable of the components at the time of disruptive
event (input to the ANN), linked with the list of components affected consequently (used as
ground truth for optimization during training and final verification).
Depending on the type of the system, preventive actions may be prioritized based
on different parameters. Examples of prioritization parameters are the predicted failure
probability of each component (provided by the neural network), importance of each component in providing essential services, and consequences of failure of each component on
other components (e.g., weighted out-degree explained in Section 3.1.3) as well as on the
operation of the system (e.g., in terms of loss of dependability [12]).
3.4.3. Evaluation of Predictive Performance. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed ANN in predicting failures, we should use metrics that capture the
predictive performance. To this end, we take advantage of the available metrics in the areas
of information retrieval and classification, namely, precision, recall, and F1 score.
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Precision shows the ratio of successful failure detections over the total detections.
The precision has a shortcoming in evaluating the performance when the ANN correctly
predicts only a portion of the failed components, but fails to detect the remainder. Recall,
also known as sensitivity, is the ratio of the failed components detected by the ANN to the
total number of failures. The shortcoming of recall is that its value is large if the ANN
simply predicts that all of the components will fail. Therefore, no single metric is enough
for evaluating the performance correctly. F1 score has been introduced to solve this issue
by combining precision and recall into a single metric by taking their harmonic mean.
Equation (3.14) shows how these metrics are calculated.
tp
tp + f p
tp
Recall =
tp + f n
Precision × Recall
F1 score = 2 ×
Precision + Recall

Precision =

(3.14)

In Equation (3.14), t p, tn, f p, and f n represent the numbers of true positives, true negatives,
false positives, and false negatives, respectively. To better understand these terms, let us
consider a commonly used example of binary classification. In this example the task of the
classifier is to determine whether a prisoner is guilty or innocent. A true positive is the case
where the prisoner is actually guilty and is correctly detected as guilty. If the guilty prisoner
is freed from the jail, it is considered a false negative. On the other hand, convicting an
innocent person is an example of false positive and freeing an innocent is a true negative.
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4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

In this section, we first present and discuss the results obtained by applying our
proposed approaches, described in Section 3, to smart power grid systems. We then explore
applicability of the same approaches to other critical infrastructure CPSs, as a specific
example, illustrate reliability modeling for an intelligent water distribution network.

4.1. CASE STUDY ON SMART GRIDS
For our case study, we have constructed two smart grids based on test systems
well-studied in power engineering literature, namely, the IEEE 14- and IEEE 57-bus test
systems [80]. To better understand the structure of a power delivery system and recognize
threats to its dependability, we review common sources of failure in the domain of smart
grids. The IEEE 14-bus system has been included in the interest of brevity and clarity and
the IEEE 57-bus system demonstrates the scalability of our methods.
4.1.1. Potential Sources of Failure in Smart Grids. Rapid developments in generation and consumption of power are causing increasing stress on distribution networks.
Among other benefits, cyber control brings more efficient use of the limited capacity available; however, each additional component used in this cyber control is a potential source
of failure, and the net effect of this increased vulnerability and complexity on the overall
reliability of the grid requires careful examination. A comprehensive dependability analysis should be able to consider every potential source of failure and reflect its effect on
the overall system state. The remainder of this section enumerates the main categories of
components that comprise a smart grid and can affect its operation by causing or increasing
the likelihood of failure. The sections of a smart grid along with respective examples of
potential failures are depicted in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1. Major sources of failure in a smart grid, by category.

4.1.1.1. Electrical infrastructure. Electric delivery systems are primarily composed of current-carrying components, including generators and transmission lines. In
several studies, transmission lines are assumed to be the main sources of vulnerability,
since generation units and similar components typically have enough backup to compensate
for their failures [81, 82]. With this assumption, reliability analysis of a power grid usually
entails tripping transmission lines, one-at-a-time, and inspecting the resulting state of the
system. This process is also referred to as N − 1 contingency analysis.
4.1.1.2. Control devices. Power flow control has traditionally relied on generator
control and voltage regulation by means of phase-shifting transformers. These techniques
are often found to be ineffective, as they rely on a permanently fixed configuration and
lack the adaptability required in smart grids. Flexible AC transmission system (FACTS)
is a technological development in electrical power systems that is based on the incorporation of power electronic devices for controlling the power system. Early developments
of the FACTS technology were in power electronic versions of the phase-shifting transformers. Unified power flow controller, static compensator, and static synchronous series
compensator are some examples of FACTS devices.
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4.1.1.3. Communications. One important feature of smart grids is the integration
of high-speed and reliable data communication networks to manage the complex power
grid effectively and intelligently. The dependability of the power management is hence
contingent on a reliable communication backbone. Various communications technologies
are utilized at different sections of smart grids. Figure 4.2 depicts communication links in
a conceptual smart grid, categorized into subsystems.

Markets

Generation

Operators

Transmission

Distribution

Service Provider

Customer

Figure 4.2. Communications in a smart grid (adapted from [1]).

In a smart grid, generation units communicate with the market and the operation
domains. The information communicated includes key parameters such as generation
capacity and shortage. In the transmission system, a significant amount of data is captured
from the grid and sent to the control centers. The control centers in turn send responses to
devices in remote substations. Distribution networks interact with multiple entities, such
as distributed generators, automatic metering infrastructure, and sensors in order to enable
provision of high-quality and stable electricity for the end-users. Operation domain mainly
communicates to the transmission and distribution systems to obtain information about
power system activities such as monitoring, maintenance, and metering. Market domain
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needs to communicate with the bulk producers of electricity and the distributed generating
resources to match the production with the demand. The customer domain communicates
with the distribution, operation, service provider, and market domains to facilitate remote
load control, monitoring of distributed generators and in-home display support [68]. Finally,
service providers communicate with the operation domain for situational awareness and
system control and to obtain metering information. They also communicate with the
customer domain to provide smart services such as management of energy use and home
energy generation.
4.1.1.4. Measurement systems. Advanced sensing and measurement technologies
evaluate the health of equipment and the integrity of the smart grid. The use of enhanced
measurement and control allows the system to operate closer to its physical limits and
increases its efficiency [45].
For better wide-area situational awareness, regional transmission operators require
information about the state of the power grid, which is achieved by specialized sensors
that provide real-time data - phasor measurement units (PMUs)- at substations. PMU
devices capture current and voltage phasor information from the electrical buses at selected
substations at sample rates of up to 60 Hz. The information received from PMUs is used by
energy management systems at control centers for improved state estimation, monitoring,
control, and protection.
Corruption of data received from the sensors or lack thereof, can result in erroneous
situational awareness or unobservability to the decision support, resulting in inappropriate
control of regulators and potentially a cascade of failures. Therefore, it is very important
to assure that the measurement devices are highly reliable, calibrated, and maintained in
specified intervals.
4.1.1.5. Computation. The evolution and use of decentralized control significantly
complicates analysis of the large-scale distributed networks. It also necessitates that communication links and data transfer functions be considered alongside computing elements
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in dependability analysis. Software engineering has enabled the development of nearlyperfect computer programs that utilize control algorithms to optimize the functionality of a
CPS; however, software faults often lead to system failures and should be considered in the
dependability analysis.
4.1.1.6. Operators. If proper planning criteria are followed most modern power
systems are designed to be able to operate safely and in a stable fashion with minor
contingencies; however, depending on the severity of a failure event, the system may
enter into an emergency state where a human operator needs to take an action. It should
be noted that human errors are inevitable and can cause catastrophic failures in critical
applications [83]. Therefore, dependability analysis should take into account the effect of
human errors as well.
4.1.2. IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 Smart Grids. The IEEE 14-bus system consists of
two generators supplying the grid with active power; 14 buses providing electricity for 11
loads; and 20 transmission lines interconnecting these buses. In order to study the effects
of utilizing intelligent control systems and communication and information technology,
we construct a smart grid from this physical system by incorporating cyber components.
According to the method presented in [84], four PMUs are placed on buses 2, 4, 6, and
9. This placement strategy provides power system observability for the control systems
and brings redundancy. Furthermore, based on the method presented in [85], three static
synchronous series compensator (SSSC) devices are installed on specific transmission lines
as depicted in Figure 4.3. SSSC is a type of FACTS device that is used for controlling the
power flows in the network.
An ideal decision support algorithm utilizes the available resources and computing
capabilities efficiently in order to mitigate faults and prevent cascading failures. Computational intelligence comprises promising approaches to solve the intricate problem of
controlling the complex networks using the information collected from the sensors, considering the “global” effects of “local” decisions in an intelligent way [86]. In our case study,

43

13

14
10

12

11
9

6
7

5

1

4

8

Generator
Load
Bus

2

3

PMU Device
SSSC Device

Figure 4.3. IEEE 14-bus smart grid.

an ANN trained with N − 1 contingencies is used as the decision support algorithm. Finding
the optimal setting for each SSSC device in all possible contingencies is a computationally
intensive task. This ANN dynamically controls the SSSC devices according to the real-time
measurements from PMUs with the objective of distributing the flow of power through all
available routes and minimizing the risk of overloading. Applicability and performance of
ANN in dynamic tuning of SSSC devices in unusual operating points are verified in [87].
Power utility companies mitigate the impacts of peak demand and impairments by load
shedding, load balancing, and line current balancing. This ANN plays a similar role in
our smart grid example and performs the same tasks autonomously. More details on the
architecture of this ANN is provided in Appendix B.
Table 4.1 highlights the performance of the ANN in practice by comparing the
number of cases that lead to system-level failure out of all simulated cases for three configurations, namely, IEEE-14 without any control devices, IEEE-14 with three fixed-tuned
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SSSC devices installed on specific lines as shown in Figure 4.3, and lastly, IEEE-14 with the
same three SSSC devices but dynamically tuned by the ANN according to the instantaneous
system state.

Table 4.1. Number of cases out of all simulated cases that lead to system-level failure for
IEEE-14.
No SSSC
devices

With fixed-tuned
SSSC devices

Single-line outages
that lead to a
cascading failure

With
dynamicallytuned SSSC
devices

2 / 20

1 / 20

1 / 20

Double-line outages
that lead to a
cascading failure

44 / 190

29 / 190

23 / 190

It is seen in Table 4.1, that utilizing fixed-tuned SSSC devices can eliminate some
of the vulnerabilities, as reflected by the reduction of the cases that lead to system-level
failure, and hence, increases the robustness of the system against single- and double-line
contingencies. Employing the ANN for dynamic tuning of SSSC devices further increases
the robustness against double-line outages, as manifested by reduction of 29 cases leading
to system-level failure down to 23.
The IEEE-57 is a larger power system that consists of seven generators; 57 buses
providing electricity for 42 loads; and 80 transmission lines interconnecting these buses.
Twelve PMUs and seven SSSC devices are also installed on specific buses and transmission
lines according to the methods presented in [84] and [85], respectively, as illustrated in
Figure 4.4. Similar to the IEEE-14 smart grid, an ANN is employed to serve as the decision
support algorithm. The ANN utilized for the IEEE-57 smart grid however, has larger input,
hidden, and output layers as it is responsible for controlling a larger system.
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In the remainder of this document, we use the following notations for the components
of smart grid that are in the scope of our analysis.
• Li− j : A transmission line connecting bus i to bus j
• Fi− j : An SSSC device installed on line Li− j
• Pi : A PMU installed at bus i
• CM: A communication link between two cyber entities
• DS: The decision support
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4.1.3. Integrated Cyber-Physical Simulator. A CPS simulator should be able
to reflect the operation of multiple aspects: sensors, data collectors, computers, control
systems, databases, communications, and the processes in the underlying physical infrastructure. Differences between cyber and physical components complicate representation of
their behavior with a single simulation tool. For most sectors of the critical infrastructure,
including power, water, and transportation, specialized simulation tools exist. These tools
have been created with the objective of accurately reflecting the operation of the physical
system, at high spatial and temporal resolution; however, the behavior of cyber infrastructure is not reflected. Despite the existence of simulation tools for cyber aspects such as
computing and communication, differences in temporal resolution and data representation
and lack of well-defined interfaces exert significant challenges to linking these simulation
tools and providing an integrated CPS simulator.
For the electric delivery system, there are a number of commercial and noncommercial computer simulation tools available. The PowerWorld Simulator [88] is a
popular commercial tool for analysis of high voltage power systems. It supports common
protection and control devices, provides an interactive environment and intuitive GUI, and
is able to solve power flow equations for very large systems; however, PowerWorld does not
provide the transparency needed for analysis of the sequence of failures. Several other commercial software packages, such as DIgSILENT [89], have the same shortcoming. Among
the non-commercial packages, MATPOWER [90] and PSAT [18] are two MATLAB-based
toolboxes commonly used for academic research. MATPOWER can solve load flow and
optimal power flow problems in a command line interface. PSAT has a graphical interface
and supports basic monitoring and protection devices and power regulators in addition to
the capabilities of MATPOWER. In this research, we used PSAT for simulation of the
power grid systems. For the purpose of our simulations, we enhanced PSAT in order
to achieve the high resolution required for analysis of smart grids. These enhancements
include defining data structures for each category of cyber components, incorporating wide-
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area measurement capabilities by PMU devices, providing a platform for implementing a
decision support algorithm, and integrating the power systems with communication technologies used in smart grid applications. This modified version of PSAT is interfaced with
a MATLAB wrapper that acts as an adapter between libraries and orchestrates subroutine
calls. Figure 4.5 visualizes the operation of our smart grid simulator.
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Control systems
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Discrete-time

Power grid







Generation
Lines and transformers
Substations
Protection devices
Storage devices
Customers

Interface
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Continuous-time

Figure 4.5. Cyber-physical smart grid simulator.

Inputs to the simulator include i) a data file that comprises power grid topology
and cyber infrastructure specifications and ii) a perturbation file that lists all contingencies
intended to be analyzed. On the other hand, the simulator returns system state, including
electrical parameters (e.g., voltages, phases, and power flows) as well as operation status
of cyber components. This output can be used to find the service indices and determine
wether the system is considered to be in a failed or operational state.
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4.2. ANALYSIS OF INTERDEPENDENCIES
Smart grids are composed of several different subsystems working together to
achieve a common goal. The close interactions between different entities, captured by
the concept of interdependence, are due to the fundamental attributes of CPSs as well as the
nature of the electric delivery system. In this section, we will study the interdependence in
smart grids using our proposed identification and quantification techniques.
In addition to the intrinsic dependencies between components, we assumed that the
operation of PMUs depends on the underlying power grid, i.e., a PMU device is disabled
as soon as a voltage violation occurs at the bus on which it is installed. Voltage violation is
defined to be outside of 0.9 to 1.1 per-unit1 range, according to the EN-50160 standard [91].
4.2.1. Selection of Failure Cases. Selection of failure cases and determining the
minimum number of failure cases needed for obtaining all of the dependencies are of great
importance in the presented method. In general, the larger the number of failure cases is,
the more accurate the model becomes; however, exhaustive examination of failure cases is
infeasible for large systems. The study presented in [75] provides a method for selection of
failure cases in analysis of power grids while a given accuracy is maintained. In this work,
we analyzed the following scenarios:
• One or two simultaneous transmission line outages,
• at most one failed SSSC device,
• at most one failed PMU, and
• failure of the decision support algorithm.
It is worth mentioning that upon availability of simulation environments capable
of modeling the communication infrastructure with high resolution, considering the effects
of respective impairments will improve the quality of the model. Unless a sophisticated
1The per-unit representation denotes normalization by a base value.
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model for channel impairments is utilized, considering communication failures simply
adds redundant failure cases and complicates representation of the results without actually
capturing the behavior of the communications. For interdependency analysis of IEEE-14
and IEEE-57 smart grids, we have not considered the communication failures.
Table 4.2 lists the number of simulations carried out for each test case. The total
number of simulations for each system is product of the number of failure cases shown for
each category of component. Note that in all of the failure cases at least one transmission
line is tripped since it is observed that the system does not degrade otherwise, even in the
presence of cyber faults; however, having one or more transmission lines tripped, impairment
of cyber components can exacerbate the situation and lead to further degradation.

Table 4.2. Number of simulated failure cases.

transmission lines
SSSC devices
PMU devices
decision support

IEEE-14
2
Í
20
k = 210

k=1
1
Í

k=0
1
Í
k=0
1
Í
k=0

total number of simulated cases

3
k

=4

3
k

=4

1
k

=2

6,720

IEEE-57
2
Í
80
k = 3, 240

k=1

1
Í

k=0
1
Í
k=0
1
Í
k=0

7
k
12
k
1
k

=8
= 13
=2

673,920

In this study, failure cases were selected based on the failure rate of components.
Transmission lines were selected because they have a relatively high rate of failure and are
a major source of power outages [81]. Additionally, we selected SSSC and PMU devices
and the decision support as representative cyber components and because their failure can
impact the state of the physical components. Including other components of the system can
enhance the model and improve the accuracy of results.

50
4.2.2. Interdependencies of IEEE Bus Systems. In this section, we present interdependencies of IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids identified using both correlation and
causation analyses. Correlation analysis requires state variable for each component to be
defined. Equation (4.1) shows definition of state variables for each category of components
in smart grids.
XLi−j (t) = | Active power flow of Li−j in p.u. at time t |


 1, Fi−j is operational at time t ;

XFi−j (t) =

 0, otherwise.



 1, Pi is operational at time t ;

XPi (t) =

 0, otherwise.

XDS (t) =

Number of observable buses and lines
Total number of buses and lines

(4.1)

In Equation (4.1), XLi−j (t) ∈ R+ , XFi−j (t) ∈ {0, 1}, XPi (t) ∈ {0, 1}, and XDS (t) ∈ [0, 1]. Note
that XDS (t) is the portion of the power system that is observable to the decision support
and is used as a measure since it well captures its operation and data dependency on PMU
devices.
Figure 4.6 helps to see how these state variables can capture the operation of a
smart grid during a failure sequence. In Figure 4.6, state variables of components of IEEE14 smart grid during a selected failure sequence are plotted on a single horizontal axis.
Note that the state variables are shown only for components that experience degradation.
Each row presents state variable of a component and the rows are ordered according to the
propagation of the faults, i.e., the two topmost rows correspond to the components whose
failure initiates the failure case (L1−5 and P2 ); third and fourth rows represent state variable
of the components that fail consequently (L1−2 and F1−5 ) and so forth. The bottommost row
shows the state variable of component F2−3 , which is known to be the last component to be
affected in this failure sequence.

51

L

1−5

P2
L1−2
State Variables

F1−5
L9−10
P9
L2−3
F2−3
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Simulation Time

Figure 4.6. State variables of selected components of IEEE-14 during a failure sequence.
Arrows indicate the points at which components are considered failed.

According to Figure 4.6, correlation among the state variables is expected to be
maximal for those degrade with one time step difference. Table 4.3 shows values of PCC
and RDC for pairs of components that degrade with one time step difference as shown in
Figure 4.6. In calculation of RDC values, sample size and number of random features are
set to 0.1 and 1, respectively.
Both correlation coefficients exhibit relatively large values for the component pairs
that are expected to have dependence; however, RDC values of dependent components
better stand out according to Table 4.3. This is mainly due to the fact that RDC captures
nonlinear as well as linear correlations, unlike PCC, which only captures linear relationships
and results in underestimating dependency between component pairs that are non-linearly
correlated. Hereinafter, we utilize and present RDC values only, due to its superiority in
capturing the interdependence.
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Table 4.3. Correlation coefficients between state variables of component pairs for those
experience degradation with one time step difference in the failure case shown in Figure 4.6.
State variables
XL1−5 XL1−2
XL1−5 XF1−5
XP2
XL1−2
XP2
XF1−5
XL1−2 XL9−10
XL1−2 XP9
XF1−5 XL9−10
XF1−5 XP9
XL9−10 XL2−3
XP9
XL2−3
XL2−3 XF2−3
Maximum among
all other pairs

PCC
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.85
0.98
0.71
1.00
0.79
0.95
0.94

RDC
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.99
0.99
0.99

0.68

0.83

For each failure case, RDC values are calculated for all pairs of state variables.
For estimating di j , mean value of RDCXi X j is calculated over all failure cases. Likewise,
the process explained in Section 3.1.2.2 is applied on the results of simulations to find
the di j values using causation analysis. For each of the methods, we found di j values and
constructed the D matrix.
The D matrices are visually represented as weighted directed graphs, in Figure 4.7
and Figure 4.8 respectively, for IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grid systems. Each edge
represents a direct dependency and its width is proportional to the extent of the dependence
(di j ). Note that edges with weights less than 0.05 are not shown in the figures for ease
of illustration. The top five links with largest weights are shown in red. It can be seen
that dependency links with large weights are captured by both correlation and causation
methods. It is also seen that the correlation-based method identifies a larger number of direct
dependencies, as causation is typically a relationship that exists only in a small fraction of
correlated events. In Appendix A, numerical values of notable direct dependency links are
provided.
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Figure 4.8. Graph representation of D matrix for IEEE-57 smart grid identified using
correlation (a) and causation (b) analyses. Notable dependency links are shown in red.
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By applying interdependency quantification methods presented in Section 3.1.3,
we computed T matrix based on direct dependencies identified using both correlation and
causation analyses. Among the values of ti j there exist links that are of great importance.
As an example, in the IEEE-14 smart grid case, the total influence from the decision support
to L1−5 is among the largest values while the corresponding direct link has a small weight
of 0.05. The pair of P32 and F1−17 in the IEEE-57 smart grid is another example with a
similar situation. This characteristic is justified by existence of several multi-step strong
dependency links that connect pairs of components together and can give rise to further
breakdown of components that are not in the geographical, logical, physical, or cyber reach
of the initially impaired component [59]. This nonlocal property of the fault propagation has
been observed in a number of real-world blackouts [2, 3]. Appendix A provides numerical
values of notable links with large multi-step dependencies.
In Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, the top five components (nodes) with highest indegree (ν) and out-degree (τ) values are specified by distinguishable markers. This analysis
identifies the cyber and physical elements that have the highest priority for further inspection
and fortification if dependability is to be improved. Among the identified components are
the bridge lines, which are responsible for transmitting the majority of the power from the
generating buses to the load buses, and PMU and SSSC devices that are installed on critical
locations of the power grid. Identifying these components using analytical methods can
be very difficult or even impossible for large systems. A more inclusive list of notable
components with large in-degree and out-degree values is shown in Appendix A.
In order to lessen the risk of dependability loss due to existence of strong in-degree
values, we can increase capacity of respective components to prevent overload, replace
them with more robust components, and utilize redundant components [20]. For mitigating
the risk exerted by strong out-degree values, a diverse selection of components should be
utilized [92]. Diversity involves the use of spatially, temporally, and functionally different
alternatives and guarantees that the components will not be affected by the same disruptions.
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In order to compare the extent of dependency among the cyber and physical subsystems, γs1 −s2 is calculated and shown in Figure 4.9. It can be seen that the most significant
dependencies are from the physical subsystem to the cyber subsystem (physical-cyber)
and within the cyber subsystem (cyber-cyber). Dependency of cyber components on the
physical components are typically in binary form (e.g., if power is not available the sensor
shuts off) which justifies the large value of corresponding γs1 −s2 value. The large value
of cyber-cyber dependency is mainly due to the nature of the common topologies of the
cyber infrastructure, in which each component is connected to multiple other components
for transmission and reception of information.
Comparing the respective γs1 −s2 values obtained from the correlation and causation
analyses, we can infer that the causation relationships among the components are less
frequent and of smaller extent, which can also be observed in the graphs provided in
Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8; however, the orders of γs1 −s2 values within each group are similar
to each other.

4.3. RELIABILITY MODELING
The most commonly studied dependability attribute for the smart grids is reliability.
This is mainly because of the fact that uninterrupted delivery of electricity has the highest
priority among objectives of the smart grids and this capability is best captured by reliability.
In this section, we apply our proposed reliability modeling approach to the smart grids. In
addition, we measure the detrimental effect of introducing additional interdependency on
the reliability of the IEEE-14 smart grid test case.
4.3.1. Definition of System Failure. Reliability is a dependability attribute that
takes a binary view of the system state, and hence, it is very important to have a clear
understanding of what is considered a “system-level failure.” We define a system failure as
comprising at least one of the following two cases:
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Figure 4.9. Comparison of dependency among subsystems (γs1 −s2 ) using correlation and
causation analyses.

• Voltage violation: Having at least one load that is supplied by a bus whose voltage
does not fall in 0.9 to 1.1 per-unit range (EN 50160 standard [91])
• Excessive outages: Concurrent failure of more than three transmission lines
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Excessive outages is not a general criterion for system-level failure of smart grids,
but according to extensive simulations on IEEE-14 and IEEE-57, leads to a cascading failure
or a voltage violation eventually. It particularly helps in eliminating the need for exhaustive
simulation of the entire system states.
4.3.2. Simulated Cases. A system composed of n components with binary states
has a total of 2n states; however, in most cases it is neither feasible, nor required to examine
all these states. For IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids, it is verified that states with more
than three concurrent transmission line outages will certainly lead to a failed state (also
reflected in our definition of system failure) and do not need to be examined. Furthermore,
occurrence of some states are practically improbable. Such states can be eliminated without
a significant impact on the accuracy of the reliability model too.
Consequently, in this work we have analyzed the following scenarios:
• Up to three simultaneous transmission line outages,
• at most one failed SSSC device,
• at most one failed PMU,
• at most one failed communication channel, and
• failure of the decision support algorithm.
For the sake of brevity, results are presented with the assumption that components
have binary states (i.e., operational or failed). Furthermore, failure of a component is
considered to be representative of failure of all backups (e.g., backup batteries and generators
and redundant communication mediums). Note that this assumption is made only for the
examples of IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids and does not restrict the approach in general.
With these assumptions, the proposed method is not computationally intensive. Recorded
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computational time for simulation of the IEEE 57-bus system is 22 minutes on an Intel
Xeon E5-2623 3.00 GHz machine, which is acceptable considering that model composition
is typically a non-real-time task.
4.3.3. Reliability Models for IEEE Bus Systems. If no cyber infrastructure is
deployed for the IEEE 14-bus system, only two specific single-line contingencies cause
system failure: respective outage of the transmission lines L1−2 and L1−5 . Any other singleline contingency leaves the system in an operational state. Furthermore, among the 190
possible double-line contingencies, only 44 leave the grid in a “failed” state. Equation (4.2)
represents system-level reliability for the IEEE-14 when no cyber infrastructure is utilized,
i.e., the system shown in Figure 4.3 without the decision support, SSSC and PMU devices,
and the interconnecting communication links.
19
2
18
Rsys = p20
L + 18qL .p L + 146qL .p L

(4.2)

In Equation (4.2), p L and qL , respectively, denote the reliability and unreliability of transmission lines, i.e., qL = 1 − p L .
For reliability analysis of the IEEE-14 smart grid, we need to investigate the systemlevel effect of all component-level failures, whether the component is in the physical or cyber
infrastructure. Cyber devices can fail in various modes, ranging in effect from fail-fault where failure of the cyber device severely impacts the operation of any other components
dependent upon it, to fail-bypass - where the cyber device fails to zero, i.e., failure of the
device is equivalent to removing it from the system. In fail-bypass mode, a failed PMU
does not send any data to the decision support, a failed SSSC device does not adjust the
power flow, and a failed decision support algorithm does not tune the SSSC devices. For
brevity, we present only the results for a fail-bypass mode. Emphasis on fail-bypass mode
is further justified by the relatively nascent stage of cyber-physical critical infrastructure,
which motivates conservative deployment of cyber devices.
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Figure 4.10 illustrates the overall system reliability of the IEEE-14 smart grid, as
a function of transmission line reliability. The horizontal axes of the plots are in logit
scale, chosen to emphasize common reliability values, expressed in “N nines” notation.
Each subfigure captures the effect of improvements to component-level reliability of a
specific category of cyber devices, i.e., the decision support algorithm, SSSCs, PMUs, and
communication links, respectively. pF , pP , pCM , and pDS , respectively, denote reliabilities
of each SSSC device, each PMU device, each communication link, and the decision support.
Mathematical representation of the reliability model for IEEE-14 smart grid is shown in
Appendix C.
Figure 4.10 confirms that more reliable transmission lines result in higher systemlevel reliability. Note that the high (e.g., five nines) reliability expected of a critical system
is not achieved unless the transmission lines are highly reliable [93]. For the case study of
a smart IEEE-14, assuming that no cyber device is less than 90% reliable (a conservative
estimate), grid reliability of five nines requires transmission lines with a reliability of at least
six nines. However, fortification focused solely on improving the reliability of transmission
lines exhibits diminishing returns.
Figure 4.10 also facilitates comparison of the improvement achieved in system-level
reliability as a result of enhancing the reliability of each category of cyber components.
This information can be used to guide the investments in fortifying the grid. For example,
comparing Figure 4.10b and Figure 4.10d confirms the intuitive notion that investing in
more reliable communication links is much more rewarding than improving reliability of
the SSSC devices.
Figure 4.11 highlights the “break-even” point for reliability of a smart grid, i.e., the
minimum reliability required of cyber components for the IEEE-14 smart grid to be more
reliable than its purely physical counterpart. This threshold is compared for different values
of transmission line reliability. For simplicity, all cyber components have been assumed
equally reliable. Among the four cases illustrated in Figure 4.11, the lowest threshold
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Figure 4.10. Effect of improving the reliability of cyber components on overall reliability
of IEEE-14 smart grid. All subfigures share the horizontal axis of (d).
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identified for the reliability of cyber components is 0.985 - relatively high for computing or
communication equipment. Our reliability analysis for this case study assumed fail-bypass
behavior for all cyber components. Other failure modes could amplify the effect of their
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Figure 4.11. Comparison of the reliability of the smart and purely physical IEEE-14 grid.

For the larger case of IEEE-57 smart grid, overall system reliability shown in
Figure 4.12 is more sensitive to the reliability of transmission lines. In general, the larger
the size of the system, the more reliable its components need to be in order to maintain
a specific level of overall system reliability. By comparing the relationship between the
subfigures of Figure 4.12 with those of Figure 4.10, we can see that the cyber components
in IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids have very similar effects on the reliability. This
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similarity is due to the fact that the cyber components in these two smart grids play similar
roles, and confirms correctness of the inferences stated above about the effect of the cyber
infrastructure on the reliability of smart grids.
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4.3.4. Effect of Additional Interdependence on Reliability. Cyber-physical interconnections among components of a CPS can expand the scope of information used for
decision support and improve the system. It can also lead to additional fault propagation
paths and degrade dependability. In this section, we investigate how added functional interdependency can degrade the reliability of the IEEE-14 smart grid, where cyber-induced
interdependencies are of greatest interest. Our investigation is comprised of assuming
additional dependencies - beyond those present in the original system - and evaluating
their impact on reliability. Figure 4.13 compares the effects of adding dependencies of
three respective types: physical-cyber, cyber-cyber, and cyber-physical. Transmission line
reliability is held at 0.999. All cyber components, i.e., PMU and SSSC devices, communication links, and decision support, are assumed to have the same reliability value of 0.95.
Each data point shown in Figure 4.13 represents the average reliability attained over 30
experiments, where each experiment consisted of modifying an arbitrary number of edges
of the original dependency graph representing the IEEE-14 smart grid, while maintaining
the value of γS1 −S2 . The weight of each modified edge, which represents the degree of
influence of one component on the other, was arbitrarily chosen. To facilitate observation
of trends, an exponential curve (depicted as a dotted line) was fitted to the data points for
each type of dependence. In all three cases, system-level reliability degrades very quickly
as the dependency index increases. Similar trends have been reported for degradation of
robustness as connectivity increases [94].
Of the three types of dependency examined, cyber-physical dependencies, where
failure of a cyber component brings down a physical component, were found to be the most
crucial. Cyber components are typically more complex, and hence, cyber failures occur
more frequently. System-level reliability is evaluated based on physical manifestations of
failure, which directly reflect the operational state of physical components. Taken together,
these two facts provide tangible justification of the rapid degradation observed in systemlevel reliability as cyber-physical dependencies increase.
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4.4. SURVIVABILITY EVALUATION
It is very unlikely in a large-scale smart grid that at a given time period all of the
components maintain a fault-free operation and the system remains in a perfect state. While
reliability takes such optimistic view of the system operation, survivability characterizes
degraded states as well. In this section, we demonstrate our proposed approach for survivability evaluation by applying it to smart grid test cases. On IEEE-57 smart grid, we
also identify the components whose failure is the most detrimental to survivability. For
verification of this importance analysis, we fortify the selected components and reevaluate
the survivability. It is expected that the IEEE-57 smart grid with fortified components
possess a higher survivability.
4.4.1. Selection of the Figure-of-Merit. The essential service expected of a smart
grid is provision of stable power to customers. We define two corresponding FoMs: the
customer service index and the average nominal voltage error. The customer service index
(CSI) reflects the fraction of customers who have received this essential service, with a
binary view – a customer is either served with adequate power or has not been served at
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all. In accordance with standards such as EN-50160 [91], our determination of whether a
customer has been served is based on whether the voltage of the bus to which the customer
is connected is within a predetermined range. For example, EN-50160 specifies a range of
0.9 to 1.1 per-unit. Equation (4.3) articulates the calculation of CSI.
CSI =

Number of customers served
Total number of customers

(4.3)

The second FoM we propose for evaluating smart grid survivability is the average nominal
voltage error (ANVE), which is calculated from the average voltage error over all load
buses that experience undervoltage or overvoltage, as in Equation (4.4). An ANVE of 1
indicates that the grid is providing full service. In contrast with CSI, which solely reflects
blackouts, ANVE considers brownouts as well.
Í
ANVE = 1 −

| Rated voltage at bus i − Actual voltage at bus i|

i

Total number of customers

(4.4)

4.4.2. Selection of Failure Cases. As power grids are typically highly reliable and
robust networks, most evaluations rely on N − 1 or N − 2 contingency analyses, i.e., a single
failure or two concurrent failures. In this work, we analyzed the consequences of an outage
of a transmission line or an SSSC device in the presence of a fault in the cyber network. The
cyber faults injected to the smart grid are manifestations of data corruption: (i) incorrect
data from PMUs, (ii) incorrect commands generated by the decision support algorithm,
and (iii) undetected errors in the communications. Note that any one of these cyber faults
alone can be tolerated by the system; however, if they are accompanied by an outage of a
transmission line, further propagation of the failures is likely. Table 4.4 lists the simulated
failure cases and the number of simulations carried out for each case.
4.4.3. Simulation Environment. Our smart grid simulator is used to determine
power flows and voltages in the network during the failure cases. Figure 4.14 illustrates the
procedure we have followed for simulating each failure case. In each outer loop, a data file
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Table 4.4. Types and numbers of faults simulated.
single transmission lines
SSSC devices
number of hardware faults simulated
PMU devices
communication links
control units
number of cyber faults simulated
total number of simulation runs

IEEE-14
20
3
23
3
6
1
10
230

IEEE-57
80
7
87
12
19
1
32
2,784

that contains the topology of the system under test is loaded and a failure case (with index
k) is executed at time te by injecting corresponding faults and/or failures. In the inner loop,
at each time step, PSAT performs power flow analysis and determines active power flow
on each line and voltage at each bus. PMU devices then measure phasor data (including
active power and voltage) of corresponding lines and buses and send it to the decision
support algorithm where new settings for SSSC devices are calculated. Updated settings
will regulate active and reactive power flow in the lines, where SSSC devices are installed.
At this point, power flow analysis is run once more to find the updated active power flows
and bus voltages. In every iteration of the inner loop after instant te , active power flow of
the lines are compared to their capacity, and if any line is overloaded, it is considered failed
and the topology is updated accordingly.
The simulation continues until no further failures are detected. For the sake of
consistency among the two IEEE bus systems and ease of comparing the plots, all simulations are continued for 25 time steps (denoted as t f inal in Figure 4.14), however, all failure
sequences terminate before the 25th time step.
Note that since the time is discrete and is determined by the software simulation tool,
the rate of degradation is bounded to a maximum value. Additionally, minor changes in the
rate of degradation due to time-specific variations may not be captured in the simulation
environment.
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Figure 4.14. Survivability evaluation procedure.

4.4.4. Simulation Results. Figure 4.15 depicts the simulation results for each of
the two test systems, using CSI and ANVE as the FoMs. In Figure 4.15, each sub-figure
depicts the change in one FoM over time, after the injection of a failure. The intensity of a
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line indicates the number of failure cases which resulted in the behavior shown by that line.
The desired outcome is a value of one, characterized by all customers being served and no
voltage error for all customers, respectively, for CSI and ANVE. Note that since the CSI is
discrete, it can hold only a finite set of values between 0 and 1.
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Figure 4.15. CSI and ANVE vs. time for IEEE14 and IEEE-57 smart grids.

These results indicate that the majority of the simulated failure cases result in
minimal degradation as the test systems are relatively robust. In the IEEE-14 smart grid
results, shown in Figure 4.15a and 4.15b, a number of failures lead to total system failure
with no customers served and maximum error for CSI and ANVE, respectively. This is
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indicated by the FoMs reaching zero. Additionally, the results show that a number of failure
cases have two phases of system degradation separated by a brief period of stabilization.
The IEEE-57 smart grid incorporates more redundancy and can tolerate a greater number
of failures. This is seen in 4.15c and 4.15d where the FoMs never reach zero.
4.4.5. Evaluation of Survivable Behavior. The maximum rate and extent of degradation were extracted from the log of each failure case.

Figure 4.16 depicts a two-

dimensional histogram of CSI and ANVE for each smart grid system. These histograms
are based on the maximum rate and extent of degradation calculated from the log of each
failure case.
In an ideal system, every one of these histograms would be dense near the origin
and sparse elsewhere, reflecting slow and minimal degradation in response to failure. This
expectation is realized for the IEEE smart grids evaluated. However, there are clusters of
failure cases with higher rates and extents of failure, which appear in the upper and/or right
regions of the histogram. The presence of these clusters indicates that many of the failure
cases simulated result in similar rates and extents of degradation. This is most likely caused
by similar failure propagation paths through the power grid, i.e., different cascading failures
involving the same vulnerable components.
4.4.6. Identifying Important Components. Our importance analysis technique is
used to identify survivability bottlenecks and guide investments in fortifying these systems.
Criticality and fragility can be determined for each component of a system, as described in
Section 3.3.3.
Table 4.5 shows the rankings of the top ten lines of IEEE 57-bus system using
fragility and criticality as criteria for hardening prioritization. It can be seen that some lines
have similar ranking in both, e.g., lines L4−18 , L3−4 , and L4−6 . The also exist a few lines
that have significantly higher priority using criticality as the metric, such as lines L8−9 and
L6−7 , which is due to the difference in the weaknesses captured by fragility and criticality
metrics. These lines fail in fewer failure cases (resulting in small fragility), but have very
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Figure 4.16. Histograms showing extent of degradation vs. rate of degradation for CSI and
ANVE. Color indicates the number of failure cases which resulted in the corresponding
degradation point.

high impact on the system FoM when they do fail (as characterized by high criticality).
Alternatively, a few lines have a significantly lower priority using criticality as a metric,
such as lines L1−2 and L1−15 . These lines fail very frequently, but their failure is relatively
insignificant in terms of system survivability.
4.4.7. Validation of Approach. In this section we validate our importance analysis
technique through targeted hardening of the IEEE 57-bus smart grid. To harden this smart
grid system the five lines with highest priority metrics were fortified by increasing their
power flow capacity by 50%, which is expected to increase the survivability of the system as
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Table 4.5. Transmission lines of IEEE 57-bus system with highest fragility and criticality.
Only the top ten lines are shown.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Line
L4−18
L1−2
L3−4
L1−15
L1−17
L4−6
L8−9
L1−16
L6−7
L2−3

Fragility (×10)
0.280
0.273
0.251
0.237
0.237
0.223
0.223
0.223
0.216
0.194

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Line
L8−9
L4−18
L3−4
L6−7
L4−6
L1−2
L1−15
L13−15
L1−16
L2−3

Criticality (×102 )
0.148
0.142
0.134
0.128
0.114
0.108
0.106
0.072
0.066
0.064

it increases fault tolerance. The same hardening effect could have been achieved by adding
redundant lines; however, this was not done in order to maintain the topology of the system
for ease of comparison. Once the system was hardened the survivability analysis was rerun
to compare the results with the original system.
First, fragility was used to select components for hardening. Lines L4−18 , L1−2 ,
L3−4 , L1−15 , and L1−17 , shown highlighted in yellow in Figure 4.17, were hardened. Next,
criticality was used to select components for hardening. Lines L8−9 , L4−18 , L3−4 , L6−7 , and
L4−6 , shown highlighted in blue in Figure 4.17, were selected to be hardened.
Comparison of the results of simulations as well as the survivability attributes for
original and hardened versions of IEEE-57 (shown in Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19) verifies
effectiveness of the hardening technique. It is seen that for the hardened systems the extent of
degradations has reduced and clusters of degradation points have moved towards the origin.
Due to the choice of the hardening method, i.e., increasing the power flow capacity of lines,
improvements in reducing the rate of degradation is not significant as seen in Figure 4.19.
Other hardening methods, e.g., use of power storage and installation of protective relays,
can be more effective in lowering the rate of degradation.
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Figure 4.17. IEEE 57-bus smart grid test system. Lines highlighted in yellow have the
highest fragility and those highlighted in blue have the highest criticality.

Comparing the survivability evaluation results of the two original and hardened IEEE
57-bus smart grids demonstrates an improvement in the survivable behavior of the system.
Both importance analysis techniques resulted in an improvement in system survivability,
using both FoMs, evident in Figure 4.18 and Figure 4.19; however, using criticality as the
metric leads to a more effective improvement over the original system. This is due to the
fact that the criticality metric better captures contribution of a component to survivability
of a system, compared to the fragility.
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(a) CSI vs. time for original IEEE-57

(b) ANVE vs. time for original IEEE-57

(c) CSI vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based on (d) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based
fragility
on fragility

(e) CSI vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based on (f) ANVE vs. time for IEEE-57 hardened based
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Figure 4.18. CSI and ANVE vs. time for original and hardened IEEE-57.

74

0.2

1204

δ

1004
0.15
803
0.1

602
401

0.05
201
0
0

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

1622
0.25
1420
0.2

1217
1014

0.15
811
0.1

608
406

0.05
203
0
0

0.1

(a) CSI histogram for original IEEE-57

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

0.1

(b) ANVE histogram for original IEEE-57

0.25
1530
0.2

1312

δ

1093
0.15
874
0.1

656
437

0.05
219
0
0

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

1984
1763
0.25
1543
0.2

1322
1102

δ

1749

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

1967

0.15
882
0.1

661
441

0.05
220
0
0

0.1

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

1405

δ

0.25

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

1606

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

1825

1806

0.1

(c) CSI histogram for IEEE-57 hardened based on (d) ANVE histogram for IEEE-57 hardened based
fragility
on fragility

1668
0.2

1430

δ

1192
0.15
953
0.1

715
477

0.05
238
0
0

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

0.1

1915
0.25
1676
0.2

1436
1197

0.15
958
0.1

718
479

0.05
239
0
0

0.02

0.04

ρ

0.06

0.08

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

0.25

2155

δ

1906

Number of Failure Cases Out of 2784

2145

0.1

(e) CSI histogram for IEEE-57 hardened based on (f) ANVE histogram for IEEE-57 hardened based
criticality
on criticality

Figure 4.19. Histograms showing extent of degradation vs. rate of degradation for CSI and
ANVE of original and hardened IEEE-57.
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4.5. PREDICTION OF FAILURES
In this section, we will present the results of training a failure prediction ANN using
the data attained by simulating several failure cases on smart grid test cases and evaluate
its performance on predicting imminent failures. Since the failure data for real-world largescale CPSs is limited, we will investigate the possibility of training the ANN with a small
subset of the available data sets and inspect its predictive capability. We randomly selected
a subset of the available data and then divided them into training, validation, and test data
sets using random selection. The training data set is used for adjusting the weights of the
ANN shown in Section 3.4, using the backpropagation technique, while the validation data
set is employed to minimize overfitting during the training cycles. Upon completion of the
training, the test data set is used for measuring the predictive performance of the ANN.
We also simulated a number of randomly selected more complex failure cases for
each smart grid system and evaluated the performance of the ANN on predicting failures
on those cases. The difference between the “simple” and the “complex” test data is that the
latter is composed of failure cases with three to five concurrent transmission line failures,
while the former is selected from the failure cases explained in Table 4.2, where at most
two transmission lines are tripped concurrently. Table 4.6 shows the number of entries of
the failure data used for the ANN.
Table 4.6. Size of the failure data sets used for the ANN.
Data set
Total failure data available
Simple failure data used for the ANN
Training data (80%)
Validation data (10%)
Test data (10%)

IEEE-14
17,968
10,000
8,000
1,000
1,000

IEEE-57
1,181,871
20,000
16,000
2,000
2,000

Complex test data

1,000

1,000
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4.5.1. Predictive Performance. Predictions on the failure cases from the complex
data sets are expected to be harder for the ANN as they are not of the same type of the
input data by which the ANN is trained. Performance measures of the ANN on simple
and complex test data sets are shown in Table 4.7. It is worth mentioning that the failure
prediction process, from inputting the system state to the ANN until receiving the output in
the form of component indices that are about to fail, takes less than one millisecond on an
Intel Xeon E5-2623 3.00 GHz machine.
Table 4.7. Predictive performance measures of the ANN.
System
IEEE-14
IEEE-57

Test Data
Simple
Complex
Simple
Complex

Precision
99.25%
90.63%
99.38%
84.83%

Recall
98.21%
83.65%
98.66%
71.55%

F1 score
98.46%
85.54%
98.87%
75.29%

As seen in Table 4.7, the ANN has an excellent performance on the simple data sets,
both for IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids. Although the ANN does not perform as good
on the complex data sets, its performance is yet acceptable. The fact that the ANN can
predict imminent failures with a high accuracy is mainly in virtue of the interdependence
among the components and existence of recurred failure sequences. Identification of such
sequences of failure that frequently occur is also useful in fortification of the system [12].
4.5.2. How Much Training Data is Needed?. Thus far, we have seen that the
ANN has a good performance in detecting the components that are about to fail, both with
high accuracy and high speed. Another equally important feature of a prediction tool is that
it maintains its performance when it is trained with a relatively small data set. In order to
investigate whether the proposed approach has this feature and to find the minimum number
of required entries in the training data set, we have performed the training process with
subsets of the available data set and measured the predictive performance of the resulting
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ANN on a fixed test data set. Figure 4.20 shows how the performance measures of the ANN
in predicting failures of the IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids are affected by varying the
size of the training data set.
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Figure 4.20. The effect of the size of training data set on predictive performance of the
ANN.
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As expected, it is seen in Figure 4.20 that the performance of the ANN degrades as
we decrease the size of the training data set. Note that due to the randomness in selection of
the training data, the performance curves are not monotonically increasing. According to
Figure 4.20, increasing the size of the training data set to more than 1000 for IEEE-14 smart
grid and 2000 for IEEE-57 smart grid does not have a significant effect on the predictive
performance of the ANN. Since the performance of the proposed ANN is not contingent
on having large training data sets it can be trained using data available in the reports of the
past power outages for developing a failure prediction tool for smart grids.

4.6. EXTENSION TO OTHER CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES
The essential assumptions made in this research are not domain-specific, making
our approach applicable to various CPSs in spite of differences in commodities, e.g., water,
power, vehicles, carried by each system. In fact, our modeling approaches seek to capture
and quantify the behaviors that are described by the dependability attributes without relying
on characteristics that are specific to the smart grid domain. As a result, our metrics
and models can be generalized to other critical infrastructures, such as intelligent water
distribution networks and intelligent transportation systems.
Prerequisites of applying the proposed techniques to other domains are: i) a simulator
capable of capturing the operation of cyber and physical entities, ii) system descriptions and
specifications such as physical and cyber topologies, and iii) definitions and assumptions
regarding the acceptable operation of the system. Among these requirements, the most
challenging problem is to build integrated cyber-physical simulators as further explained in
Section 4.1.3.
4.6.1. Intelligent Water Distribution Network. A prominent example of critical
infrastructure CPSs are intelligent water distribution networks (IWDNs), which are very
similar in topology and structure to smart grids. The physical infrastructure of a smart
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grid is responsible for delivery of electricity from he generators, through transmission and
distribution lines, to end-users. Similarly, an IWDN transfers water from reservoirs and
tanks to customers through a network of pipes. Figure 4.21 depicts a hypothetical IWDN.

Computing Devices

Information flow
(commands)

Information flow
(sensor data)

Sensor

Valve
(control device)

Physical commodity flow (water)
Reservois (source)
Consumer (sink)

Figure 4.21. An IWDN.

The cyber infrastructure of the IWDN seeks to make effective use of water resources
by increasing the number of pathways for water circulation. Decision support uses the
information collected by several sensors dispersed in the physical infrastructure and actuates
the hardware controllers to manage the allocation (quantity) and chemical composition
(quality) of the water. Despite the undeniable performance gains facilitate by the cyber
infrastructure, it is critical to verify that dependability aspects is not compromised. This
task is facilitated by model-based approaches such as our proposed MIS model, which we
derive for an IWDN in the remainder of this section.
4.6.1.1. Test case. The IWDN analyzed in our case study, depicted in Figure 4.22,
consists of two water sources (a reservoir at node 1 and a tank at node 11), nine demand
nodes (2-10), four valves (96, 97, 98, 99), and thirteen pipes (1-11, 98a, 98b). The reservoir
is capable of providing an infinite supply of water, while the tank’s supply is limited by
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the tank diameter and water level, which are predefined. The system has a single pump
located at the reservoir which maintains the flow and head. The pipes and valves are the
main components that control the flow and provide water to the consumers represented by
the demand nodes. The topology of the physical water distribution network studied is based
on the water network analyzed in [95, 96] to enable comparison of the reliability evaluation
results. We added additional components, including a tank and multiple valves, to create
a more robust system, but neither the basic structure, i.e., elevation of nodes and topology
of the network, nor the supply and demand (in million gallons per day) specifications were
altered. Table 4.8 presents the parameters associated to the physical infrastructure of this
IWDN.
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Figure 4.22. Physical infrastructure of the IWDN studied.

This water network is being monitored and controlled by a rule-based system that
is considered as the cyber infrastructure. This decision support entity uses data collected
from the water system and sends control commands to the actuators with the objective of
maintaining the flow of water to the demand nodes.
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Table 4.8. Parameters of the IWDN simulated.
Node
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
8a
4a
6a
5a
Pipe
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
98a
99a

Elevation (ft.)
100
100
200
210
230
250
10
10
50
25
10
210
250
230
From node / To node
2/3
3/4
3/6a
4/5a
6/5
8/7
8/9
7/9
10/7
7/10
11/6
4a/10
5/8a

Demand (mgd)
-6.62
0.73
1.2
0.6
0.4
0.82
0.6
0.8
0.4
0.2
0
0
0
0
Length (ft.)
200
1500
1800
2000
1900
1000
2500
3500
1500
1500
1000
500
500

Normal head (ft.)
100
388.48
386.43
376.80
377.54
380.05
173.57
170.31
160.87
181.37
Diameter (in.)
16
12
14
10
14
8
10
8
10
6
12
6
4

Minimum head
146
246
256
276
296
56
56
96
96
Roughness
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
100
65
65

4.6.1.2. Definition of system failure. We defined a system failure as comprising
one or more of the following three cases:
• Negative pressure: Having a negative pressure in any pipe or at any node
• Water shortage: Having a node which is supplied with less than 80% of its demand
• Excessive outages: Concurrent failure of more than three components
Excessive outages is not a general criterion, but is used to eliminate the need for
exhaustive simulation of the entire system states. The number of failures that comprise
excessive outage can be set based on the size and number of components of the system.
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4.6.1.3. Simulations. An integrated simulation environment is used to understand
the operation of water distribution network and to determine the failed and operational states.
For the physical infrastructure, we have used EPANET, which is a water distribution network
simulator developed by the US Environmental Protection Agency to study functional aspects
of the system, such as demand patterns, water quantity (flow and pressure head), and water
quality (contaminants and minerals). As EPANET is incapable of simulating intelligent
decision support, we constructed specific libraries in MATLAB to simulate the cyber
infrastructure. This integrated cyber-physical simulation environment is based on the work
presented in [97]. The simulation procedure, depicted in Figure 4.23, was conducted as
follows:
1. Set fault conditions
2. Run EPANET and generate operation report
3. Parse the report and extract input for the decision support
4. Operate the decision support algorithm to determine controller settings
5. Output control settings as an EPANET INP file
6. Provide the INP file to EPANET and observe simulation results
EPANET produces a report of the flow and pressure at each node and in each
component, as well as a negative pressure warning. These reports were parsed and loaded
into MATLAB to determine whether the injected fault conditions result in a system-level
failure.
4.6.1.4. Reliability model. As mentioned in Section 4.6.1.2, all triple-component
failures are considered system-level failure states. The results of single-component and
double-component fault injection were used to generate the reliability model. A number of
representative failure scenarios are presented in Table 4.9.
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Figure 4.23. Cyber-physical simulation procedure.
Table 4.9. Representative failure scenarios.
Failed component
Pump
Tank
Pipe 1
Pipe 6
Pipe 98a
Pipes 7 and 8
Valve 98
Valve 99

State
failed
operational
failed
operational
failed
failed
failed
operational

Failure time
3
6
0
0
3
-

Description
negative pressure at nodes 2, 3, and 4
negative pressure at node 3 and 4
negative pressure
negative pressure at node 9
negative pressure

After identifying the failed and operational states, we can populate the reliability
model using the Markov chain imbeddable structure as explained in Section 3.2. Figure 4.24
plots the overall reliability of the system in terms of the reliability of the pipes with three
different assumptions about the valves. pPI , pV , pT , pPU , and pC yber respectively, denote
reliabilities of each pipe, each valve, each tank, each pump, and the overall reliability of
the cyber infrastructure. As expected, we see that improving the reliability of pipes (as the
main physical components of a water distribution network) has a significant impact on the
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reliability of the system. It is also shown that the valves are required to be highly reliable
to attain a system with acceptable service, even if the pipes are near perfect. Mathematical
representation of the reliability model for this IWDN is shown in Appendix D.
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Figure 4.24. Effect of the valves on system-level reliability.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The objective of the research presented in this dissertation is to develop quantitative
models for dependability attributes of CPSs. The scope of this work comprises reliability and
survivability, as meaningful dependability attributes for analyzing domains of our interest.
We have investigated interdependency to enable composition of a unified dependability
model from these disparate attributes. Our main focus is on smart grids, as prominent
examples of critical infrastructure CPSs. In our case study, we have used the IEEE 14- and
57-bus test systems as bases for developing smart grid examples. To demonstrate generality
of our approach, we illustrate the application of our reliability modeling technique to an
IWDN.
We have investigated the use of correlation and causation metrics for detection
and quantification of the extent of dependency links among the components of a CPS.
We have created quantitative interdependency metrics, which seek to capture the effect of
multi-step dependencies as well as immediate dependency links. These interdependency
metrics reveal important, but previously indiscernible, links among the components. The
importance of this revelation is amplified by the fact that some components thus revealed to
be strongly dependent are not within geographical, logical, physical, or cyber proximity of
each other. This nonlocal property of fault propagation has been observed in the past and
was demonstrated through the test cases in this work.
Our reliability analysis reiterates the urgency of improving the computational and
communication technologies that underpin modern critical infrastructures. We simulated
several failure cases to populate a Markovian reliability model and observed through quantitative analysis that introducing additional interdependency can exponentially degrade
system reliability. Propagation of failure from cyber to physical components was found to
compromise system-level reliability to the greatest extent.
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To better quantify the success of CPSs in achieving their stated goals, such as the
ability to autonomously defend against attacks and remediate the consequences of failure, we
presented an approach for evaluation of survivability. This approach quantifies attributes
pivotal to survivability by determining the rate and extent of degradation of a domainspecific figure-of-merit during a number of selected failure cases. These results were used
to identify critical components whose hardening would be most beneficial to survivability.
Our final contribution is a neural networks approach for prediction of imminent
component failures. This neural network exhibited excellent predictive performance, which
could be attributed in part to the high level of interdependence among components of the
systems analyzed. Several related studies from the literature have confirmed the high level
of interdependency and corroborated the existence of recurrent failure sequences in most
critical infrastructures. These observations support the promise of our failure prediction
approach for being efficiently applied to domains other than power.
Proposed avenues for future extension of this research include the following:
• To date, we have assumed that the communication infrastructure will remain functional despite other failures in the critical infrastructure being examined. Considering communication impairments, and data corruption as a manifestation thereof,
will refine and increase the accuracy of our dependability model. Corrupted data
may originate in malicious attacks to the communication infrastructure or accidental
faults during measurement, communication, processing, and storage. While consideration of additional components, e.g., communication links, improves the accuracy
of a dependability model, it also increases the size of the system state space and
computational complexity. The computational complexity of our proposed modeling
approach is not prohibitive for systems with fewer than 500 components; however, a
more judicious state elimination method is needed for application to larger-scale CPSs
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or more refined analysis that examines the system at a higher level of granularity. In
systems with independent components, superposition can alleviate the computational
burden.
• A challenging task in dependability modeling is to identify essential services of the
system being investigated. Equally important is finding an appropriate definition of
system-level failure. Qualitative dependability studies, and specifically an ontology,
can be utilized to this end. It is very common for a large-scale system to have multiple
objectives and provide more than one service. To address this challenge, individual
FoMs can be combined to create a multi-dimensional FoM, leading to another avenue
for extending our current research.
• Our dependability modeling approaches are useful regardless of whether the disruptive event is caused by an accidental failure or a malicious attack; however, targeted
cyber-physical attacks may render plausible a number of specific degraded states
omitted from our current analysis. Any omission of plausible degraded states can
cause potential overestimation of dependability attributes. This concern inspires more
careful consideration of the consequences of cyber attacks in future extensions to our
work.
• Tools and techniques for machine learning are ubiquitous and fast-growing, and
improving in reliability and accuracy. This allows them to be utilized in critical
applications. We have demonstrated applicability of a well-known machine learning
tool, the ANN, for prediction of failures in CPSs. As an improvement to this research,
state-of-the-art methods such as recurrent neural networks (a more advanced ANN
architecture) may be used to incorporate temporal features of the failures as well.

APPENDIX A

NOTABLE INTERDEPENDENCY METRICS FOR IEEE TEST SYSTEMS
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In interdependency analysis of the IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids, weights are
assigned to each node as well as each dependency link. In Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, these
weights are displayed using a graph representation. In this section, numerical values of the
weights for notable nodes and links are provided. For easier comparison, we also include
the values attained from correlation analysis using the PCC metric. Tables A.1 and A.2
show the top ten direct dependency links for IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids, respectively.
Similarly, Tables A.3 and A.4 indicate the most remarkable pairs of components that despite
weak direct dependencies, have large multi-step dependency links. Finally, Tables A.5
through A.8 show the top ten components with largest in-degree/out-degree values for
IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grids.

Table A.1. Notable dependencies among components of IEEE-14 smart grid.
PCC
Components
L1−2 - L1−5
L2−3 - F2−3
L2−4 - F2−4
P2 - L1−2
F1−5 - L1−2
L4−5 - L1−2
L1−5 - F1−5
F1−5 - L1−5
L2−3 - L1−5
L4−9 - L1−2

di j
0.73
0.60
0.52
0.49
0.48
0.45
0.43
0.35
0.34
0.33

RDC
Components
L1−2 - L1−5
L2−3 - F2−3
L2−4 - F2−4
L4−5 - L1−2
P2 - L1−2
F1−5 - L1−2
L1−5 - F1−5
F1−5 - L1−5
L1−5 - L1−2
L2−3 - L1−5

di j
0.83
0.79
0.72
0.61
0.60
0.57
0.56
0.52
0.46
0.46

Causation
Components di j
L1−2 - L1−5
0.83
L2−3 - F2−3
0.81
L2−4 - F2−4
0.77
L1−5 - F1−5
0.56
F1−5 - L1−2
0.39
P2 - L1−2
0.32
L1−5 - P9
0.20
L2−3 - L4−5
0.13
DS - L1−2
0.12
L7−9 - L9−10 0.12
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Table A.2. Notable dependencies among components of IEEE-57 smart grid.
PCC
Components
L1−17 - F1−17
L7−29 - L8−9
L12−17 - F12−17
L2−3 - L1−15
F1−16 - F1−16
L7−8 - F7−8
L34−35 - P32
L28−29 - P28
L9−55 - P53
L37−38 - P32

di j
0.76
0.73
0.72
0.69
0.68
0.67
0.65
0.65
0.65
0.65

RDC
Components
L7−29 - L8−9
L12−17 - F12−17
L1−17 - F1−17
L28−29 - P28
L34−35 - P32
L9−55 - P53
L37−38 - P32
L37−38 - P56
L34−32 - P32
L35−36 - P32

di j
0.96
0.94
0.93
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.91
0.91

Causation
Components
L12−17 - F12−17
L1−17 - F1−17
L28−29 - P28
L7−29 - L8−9
L1−16 - F1−16
L37−38 - P56
L7−8 - F7−8
L6−7 - F6−7
L54−55 - F54−55
L7−29 - P28

di j
0.95
0.94
0.92
0.92
0.91
0.91
0.91
0.90
0.88
0.87

Table A.3. Notable multi-step dependency links among components of IEEE-14 smart grid;
dependency links that are relatively large in T, but small in D.
PCC
Components
L2−3 - L1−2
L4−5 - L1−5
L2−3 - L1−5
L2−4 - L1−5
L2−3 - F1−5
L2−3 - L1−2
P2 - L1−5
L2−4 - L1−2
L2−4 - F1−5
L5−6 - L1−5

RDC
Components
L2−3 - L1−2
L2−3 - L1−5
L4−5 - L1−5
L2−4 - L1−5
L2−3 - F1−5
L2−4 - L1−2
L2−4 - F1−5
L4−5 - F1−5
L5−6 - L1−5
L7−9 - L1−5

Causation
Components
L1−2 - F1−5
F1−5 - L1−5
P2 - L1−5
L1−5 - L1−2
L1−2 - P9
P2 - F1−5
DS - L1−5
F1−5 - P9
L4−5 - L1−5
DS - F1−5

Table A.4. Notable multi-step dependency links among components of IEEE-57 smart grid;
dependency links that are relatively large in T, but small in D.
PCC
Components
L7−29 - L1−15
L7−29 - L1−2
L7−29 - F7−8
L7−29 - P32
L7−29 - F1−17
L7−29 - L1−17
L1−16 - P32
L7−29 - L7−8
L1−15 - P32
L8−9 - L1−15

RDC
Components
L7−29 - L1−15
L7−29 - L1−2
L7−29 - F7−8
L1−16 - P32
L7−29 - F1−17
L7−29 - L1−17
L7−29 - P32
L1−2 - P32
L1−15 - P32
L1−16 - F1−17

Causation
Components
L7−29 - L7−8
L7−8 - F6−8
L8−9 - F7−8
L1−16 - L1−2
L7−29 - L6−8
L1−15 - F1−17
L8−9 - F6−8
L1−2 - F1−17
P32 - F1−17
L1−2 - F1−16
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Table A.5. Largest weighted out-degree values in the IEEE-14 smart grid.
PCC
Component
L2−3
L4−5
L2−4
L1−2
P9
L1−5
F1−5
P2
F2−3
L5−6

τ
0.239
0.219
0.215
0.205
0.196
0.193
0.188
0.187
0.185
0.178

RDC
Components
L2−3
L4−5
L2−4
L1−2
L7−9
P2
L5−6
L1−5
F1−5
P9

τ
0.244
0.234
0.220
0.206
0.200
0.199
0.197
0.196
0.194
0.191

Causation
Component
τ
L1−2
0.206
L1−5
0.187
L4−5
0.152
F1−5
0.143
L2−3
0.128
P2
0.127
L2−4
0.113
P9
0.093
DS
0.091
L7−9
0.071

Table A.6. Largest weighted out-degree values in the IEEE-57 smart grid.
PCC
Component
L7−29
L8−9
L1−2
L1−16
L1−15
L7−8
P25
L12−17
P19
P28

τ
0.073
0.069
0.063
0.063
0.062
0.055
0.053
0.052
0.051
0.050

RDC
Components
L7−29
L1−16
L1−2
L8−9
L1−15
L3−4
L22−23
L37−39
L7−8
L12−17

τ
0.072
0.067
0.067
0.067
0.063
0.060
0.060
0.058
0.056
0.054

Causation
Component
τ
L1−2
0.047
L7−29
0.038
L1−15
0.033
L1−16
0.031
L7−8
0.028
L22−23
0.025
L8−9
0.024
L1−17
0.018
L37−38
0.018
L6−8
0.016

Table A.7. Largest weighted in-degree values in the IEEE-14 smart grid.
PCC
Component
L1−2
L1−5
F1−5
P9
F2−3
F2−4
L4−5
L2−3
L9−10
L7−9

ν
0.591
0.575
0.497
0.421
0.318
0.269
0.263
0.219
0.187
0.175

RDC
Components
L1−5
L1−2
F1−5
P9
F2−3
L4−5
F2−4
L9−10
L2−3
L7−9

ν
0.604
0.594
0.495
0.427
0.322
0.285
0.280
0.237
0.210
0.208

Causation
Component
ν
L1−5
0.181
L1−2
0.1168
F1−5
0.151
P9
0.148
L4−5
0.118
L9−10
0.103
F2−3
0.101
L7−9
0.093
F2−4
0.088
L2−3
0.080
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Table A.8. Largest weighted in-degree values in the IEEE-57 smart grid.
PCC
Component
F1−17
L1−17
P32
L1−15
L1−2
P28
P25
P53
F1−16
F7−8

ν
0.130
0.130
0.116
0.101
0.086
0.083
0.081
0.081
0.077
0.077

RDC
Components
L1−17
F1−17
P32
L1−15
L1−2
P25
P28
P53
F1−16
P56

ν
0.132
0.128
0.126
0.109
0.099
0.092
0.092
0.089
0.084
0.084

Causation
Component
ν
P32
0.045
L1−17
0.043
F1−17
0.031
L1−15
0.028
P28
0.027
P53
0.023
L8−9
0.022
P25
0.020
L7−8
0.019
P56
0.019
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For each of the IEEE-14 and IEEE-57 smart grid systems, we designed and trained
an ANN to provide decision support. Each of these ANNs has one input layer, fed with
parameters describing system status (i.e., bus voltages and line power flows), one hidden
layer, and one output layer, providing settings for SSSC devices. Each ANN is trained by a
lookup table generated by exhaustive search for optimal settings on N-1 failure cases. The
exhaustive search is performed seeking for the settings that minimize line overloads and is
calculated as shown in Equation (B.1).

θ=

 2µ
n 
Õ
Pi
i=1

(B.1)

Ci

where n is the number of lines; Pi and Ci are the active power flow and maximum capacity
of line i, respectively; µ controls the extent to which a given setting should be penalized for
line overloads. We have set µ = 5.
Figure B.1 shows the architecture of the ANN used for dynamic adjustment of SSSC
settings.

Input layer

Hidden layer

Output layer

L1
L2
SSSC1

Line states

∙∙∙
Lnl

SSSC2

∙∙∙

B1

∙∙∙

B2

Bus states

SSSCnf

∙∙∙
Bnb

Figure B.1. Architecture of the ANN used for decision support of IEEE test cases.
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Table B.1 shows for each of the IEEE test cases, the number of nodes at each layer.

Table B.1. Number of nodes at each layer of the ANN used as decision support for IEEE
test cases.
input layer
hidden layer
output layer

IEEE-14
34
20
3

IEEE-57
137
75
7

The R2 measure of goodness of fit for the ANNs trained for IEEE-14 and IEEE-57
smart grids are 0.92 and 0.90, respectively.
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System-level reliability of IEEE-14 smart grid in fail-bypass mode is shown in
Equation (C.1), where pDS , pF , pP , p L , and pCM , respectively, represent the (componentlevel) reliability of the control algorithm, each SSSC device, each PMU device, each
transmission line, and each communication link. For every component-level reliability
value p, the corresponding unreliability is defined as q = 1 − p. For a better tractability, but
without loss of generality, all components of the same type (e.g., all PMUs) are considered
to be equally reliable.

Rsys = p20
L +

19pDS .pF 3 .pP 4 .qL .p L 19 .pCM 7 +
167pDS .pF 3 .pP 4 .qL 2 .p L 18 .pCM 7 +
76pDS .pF 3 .qP .pP 3 .qL .p L 19 .pCM 6 +
76pDS .pF 3 .pP 4 .qL .p L 19 .qCM .pCM 6 +
668pDS .pF 3 .qP .pP 3 .qL 2 .p L 18 .pCM 6 +
835pDS .pF 3 .pP 4 .qL 2 .p L 18 .qCM .pCM 6 +
56pDS .qF .pF 2 .pP 4 .qL .p L 19 .pCM 6 +
481pDS .qF .pF 2 .pP 4 .qL 2 .p L 18 .pCM 6 +
219pDS .qF .pF 2 .qP .pP 3 .qL .p L 19 .pCM 5 +
219pDS .qF .pF 2 .pP 4 .qL .p L 19 .qCM .pCM 5 +
1849pDS .qF .pF 2 .qP .pP 3 .qL 2 .p L 18 .pCM 5 +
1849pDS .qF .pF 2 .pP 4 .qL 2 .p L 18 .qCM .pCM 5 +
16qDS .pF 3 .qL .p L 19 +
393qDS .pF 3 .qL 2 .p L 18 +
221qDS .qF .pF 2 .qL .p L 19 +
1705qDS .qF .pF 2 .qL 2 .p L 18

(C.1)

Equation (C.1) can be interpreted as the sum of probabilities of being in any of the
states that do not lead to a failure (as defined in Section 4.3.1). The system can withstand
cyber impairments in virtue of the relatively conservative fail-bypass mode, as manifested by
the term p20
L . The subsequent terms correspond to the cases where at least one transmission
lines is in outage, and hence, fault-free operation of the cyber network is needed in order to
mitigate the impacts of disruptions imposed to the system.
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System-level reliability of the IWDN studied in this document is as shown in Equation (D.1), where pPU , pT , pPI , pV , and pC yber , respectively, represent the component-level
reliability of the pump, the tank, each pipe, each valve, and the overall reliability of the
cyber infrastructure. For each component-level reliability value, p, the corresponding unreliability is defined as q = 1 − p. For better tractability, but without loss of generality, all
components of the same type (e.g., all pipes) are considered to be equally reliable.

Rsys = pPU .pT .pPI 13 .pV 4 .pC yber +
pPU .qT .pPI 13 .pV 4 .pC yber +
8pPU .qT .pPI 12 .qPI .pV 4 .pC yber +
pPU .qT .pPI 13 .pV 4 .qC yber +
10pPU .pT .pPI 12 .qPI .pV 4 .pC yber +
31pPU .pT .pPI 11 .qPI 2 .pV 4 .pC yber +
16pPU .pT .pPI 12 .qPI .pV 3 .qV .pC yber +
5pPU .pT .pPI 12 .qPI .pV 4 .qC yber +
3pPU .pT .pPI 13 .pV 3 .qV .pC yber +
pPU .pT .p L 13 .pV 4 .qC yber

(D.1)

Equation (D.1) can be interpreted as the sum of probabilities of being in any of the
states that do not lead to a failure (as defined in Section 4.6.1.2).
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